21.01.2003 - Source: EurasiaNet

Eurasianet: Description of Georgia's "Reformers" ("Georgia`s mounting opposition") [#10573],  [ID 4701]

"For many years, whether in government or the opposition, Zhvania and Saakashvili were seen as a unified, pro-Western influence in Georgian politics. However, in 2001, the two politicians challenged each other for the mantle of the country’s top reformer. In particular, Saakashvili, who in the past had deferred to Zhvania, seemed determined to stake out his own place on the Georgian political map.

In August of 2001, Saakashvili launched a radical protest against the president by resigning his post as minister of justice. In September and October of 2001, both Saakashvili and Zhvania led street demonstrations that peaked with protests against the government’s illegal raid of popular independent television station Rustavi-2. To quell the discord, Shevardnadze sacked several of his top government ministers (including Kakha Targamadze, a staunch enemy of the Reformers). In the midst of their cooperation on the protests, however, Saakashvili widened the gap with Zhvania by launching his own party, the National Movement.

Meanwhile, Zhvania was intent on gaining control of the remnants of the CUG, largely because of its property holdings and powerful regional network, matched by no other party other than the New Rights. However, in May 2002, a few weeks before Georgia’s local elections, a Tbilisi court ruled that the pro-presidential faction had the legal right to the CUG’s name and property. The country’s highest court, headed by a former Zhvania ally, Lado Chanturia, later upheld the decision. Unable to use the CUG name, Zhvania launched a new party of his own, the United Democrats, in June 2002.

While Saakashvili and Zhvania claim to share a common vision for Georgia’s future, their political tactics and electoral appeal are often at odds. Saakashvili’s popularity hinges largely on his populist rhetoric, which includes a call for Shevardnadze’s immediate resignation. This goes over well with some residents of Tbilisi, where Saakashvili enjoys the support of the popular station Rustavi-2 and a significant portion of the professional classes. Saakashvili has recently moved to form an alliance with two parties: the Traditionalists, who have little political support currently but control 10 seats in Parliament, and Unity, Georgia’s most pro-Russian party, led by Shevardnadze’s one-time opponent for the Presidency Jumber Patiashvili.

Zhvania opposes Saakashvili’s more radical stance and has pushed for a more moderate opposition alliance. While most political parties have been willing to participate in a political dialogue sponsored by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), there has been little movement thus far towards forming a grand coalition.

Their many differences notwithstanding, three factors may push Zhvania and Saakashvili toward reconciliation. First, it is unlikely that Saakashvili could build a regional network – which he needs if he is to be a force in the parliamentary elections – without the assistance of a strong organizer like Zhvania. Second, both have so far failed to elaborate a positive, unique vision for Georgia’s future. Since their left-of-center political beliefs are quite similar, the stage would be extremely crowded if they tried to stake out separate pieces of political territory. Cooperating may assist them in developing a coherent, popular platform. Third, an alliance could shore up the group’s funding base, since the largest source of financial support – the business community – is firmly in a different camp."

Document(s): Open document

06.2002 - Source: British Helsinki Human Rights Group

BHHRG: The "Young Reformers" vehemently oppose President Shevardnaze ("Report: Georgia 2002") [#8566],  [ID 4702]

"Georgia’s domestic politics have taken on a new twist over the past year, as the West has grown more supportive of the “Young Reformers” vehemently opposed to President Shevardnadze [see BHHRG’s Georgia 2001 report]. The West’s “bright young stars” in Georgia have come in the form of two former allies of the Georgian president: Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania.

The 33-year-old Saakashvili – a former justice minister and now chairman of the parliamentary anti-corruption committee – frequently travels to Western capitals with his American wife where he is wined, dined and courted by the same politicians who once treated Mr. Shevardnadze with great respect. A few months before the election, a political grouping known as the “National Movement-Democratic Front” (abbreviated in Georgian as EMDP) materialised as the campaign vehicle for Mr. Saakashvili, an ex-member of Mr. Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union of Georgia (SMK) party. Days before June 2nd, Mr. Saakashvili flew to Strasbourg to urge the Council of Europe to send observers, claiming that the poll would be falsified.

Saakashvili has staged demonstrations in the streets of Tbilisi over the last several months under the slogan “Georgia Without Shevardnadze,” harking back to the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement in early 2001 that accompanied calls from Western capitals that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma should step down [see BHHRG’s Ukraine 2001 report]. Although the demonstrations have been sparsely attended (like those against Kuchma), Mr. Saakashvili still enjoys Western support. His biography, published with the help of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is sold in bookstores on Rustaveli Street, Tbilisi’s main thoroughfare, and features photos of Mr. Saakashvili meeting top American and other Western politicians.

Like Mr. Saakashvili, former Parliamentary Speaker Zurab Zhvania also hails from the SMK, and went to great lengths to contest the rights to the SMK party name for the local elections. Upon losing in court, Mr. Zhvania’s public anger at forfeiting the right to campaign as head of the SMK may at first have struck the average foreign observer as odd from an electoral perspective, since the SMK party name is inextricably linked to a politician Mr. Zhvania claims is reviled by Georgians (i.e., Mr. Shevardnadze). But evidently Mr. Zhvania still regarded the remnants of the SMK party “apparat” (the original SMK has already split into several factions) as valuable enough to serve his electoral purposes.

Ultimately, Mr. Zhvania ran at the head of a party called the “Christian Conservative” Party. After losing the battle over the SMK rights, the leader of the Christian Conservative Party (Shota Malashkia) approached Mr. Zhvania and offered him the rights to use that party’s name. Mr. Malashkia, said Ms. Gogorishvili, had complied with all regulations to register his party, but was so appalled by the “injustice” perpetrated against Mr. Zhvania that he simply handed over his party’s name to the ex-speaker without asking for anything in return. Ms. Gogorishvili said Mr. Malashkia had done this out of pure “good will.”"

Document(s): Internal affairs
Polling day Conclusion Open document