10.01.2007 - Source: Minorities at Risk

Chronology of events concerning Adzhars in Georgia (901 - May 2000) ("Chronology for Adzhars in Georgia") [#37949],  [ID 5013]

Document(s): Open document

09.01.2001 - Source:

University of Maryland - Minorities at Risk: Background Information ("09.01.2001 - University of Maryland - Minorities at Risk: Background Information") [ID 5014]

"The Adzhars are a Muslim people dwelling in the autonomous region of Adzharia in south-western Georgia along the Black Sea (GROUPCON = 3). They are part of a religious minority that is not ethnoculturally distinct from ethnic Georgians (RELIG = 1), but Adzhars nonetheless possess a strong group identity (COHESX9 = 5). The capital of Adzharia is the important Black Sea port of Batumi, through which much of the oil from the Caspian Sea flows. Due to this and the general stability of the region, the Adzhars enjoy a great degree of economic prosperity and a higher standard living than the rest of Georgia.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the nationalist Gamsakhurdia regime in Tblisi made a concerted effort to stamp out ethnic differences and create a "Georgia for Georgians." In Adzharia this took the form of a campaign to replace Islam with an "atheist upbringing" throughout the region. This religious discrimination created a great deal of tension and calls from Adzhar nationalists to break apart from Georgia.
Today Adzharia does enjoy de facto independence from Georgia (POLDIS00 and ECDIS00 = 0). However, the strategy they used to achieve that independence was quite different from the other autonomous regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where bloody rebellions broke out that have yet to be fully settled. By contrast, despite the extreme turbulence of post-Soviet Georgian politics, Aslan Abashidze has maintained Adzharia as an island of stability. Since becoming leader of Adzharia in 1991 within a local political structure that remained Soviet and Communist, Abashidze has demonstrated virtuoso political leadership. Unlike the rulers of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Abashidze was careful not to challenge, even rhetorically, the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. In fact, even when charting an independent course from both the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze regimes, he has consistently denied that his government harbors any separatist agenda. This public position, coupled with the severe weakness of the Georgian government (since 1991 battered by one civil and two ethnic wars), has made Shevardnadze willing to allow Abashidze wide latitude.
Despite his success, or rather because of it, Abashidze and the Adzhars face powerful enemies in Georgia proper. Georgian nationalists well understand that Adzharia has achieved de facto independence, and fear that should the region develop economically it might opt for de jure sovereignty. Georgian extremist elements have therefore repeatedly sought to destabilize Adzharia, even by planning and executing terrorist acts. Abashidze has charged that Georgian security services have made at least three attempts to assassinate him.
After winning reelection as Georgia's president in April 2000, in part due to Abashidze's active endorsement, Shevardnadze credited the Adzhar leader's success to the fact that he "has always taken a stand for a single, strong and integral Georgia." In addition to reciprocating Abashidze's political support, Shevardnadze has granted his colleague important substantive concessions, including allowing Adzharia to declare itself a free economic zone in November 1994. Most remarkably for a Muslim leader of an autonomous region, Abashidze in recent years has emerged as one of Georgia's most popular politicos. In the April 2000 elections, Abashidze even mounted a strong opposition to Shevardnadze in the nationwide presidential race. In a pre-election deal, Abashidze agreed to drop out of the race in exchange for full republic status for Adzharia. In May 2000, Georgia officially became a federation, and it was widely hoped that this would set a peaceful precedent that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could follow to settle their conflicts (thus far the "republic status" option has not proven attractive to either group, however). Few observers expect Abashidze to remain out of Georgian national politics for long – some even suspect that he is being groomed as a possible successor to Shevardnadze.
A rare example of peaceful conflict resolution in 1990s Georgia, Adzharia is hardly an ideal of post-Communist political development. Abashidze has followed what might be called the "Tito option": the achievement of ethnic peace through coercion. While there is no evidence that Adzharia's small Christian Georgian, Russian, or Armenian minorities are targeted for persecution, politics operates within an extremely circumscribed range defined by the Abashidze coterie. As demonstrated by elections held in November 1995 that were questionable at best, Abashidze is unwilling to submit his tenure to genuine democratic scrutiny. The dominance of Abashidze's political machine – formerly the Communist Party apparatus but currently known as the Union of Georgia's Revival, a title undoubtedly chosen to highlight fidelity to the territorial integrity of the country – does not mean that there is no sentiment for an opposition, it simply indicates that such a force cannot exist in Adzharia's Soviet-style political system."

Document(s): 09.01.2001 - University of Maryland - Minorities at Risk: Background Information