Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Laogai - China's vast forced labor camp system ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3748]

"All authoritarian regimes inherently must maintain a repressive mechanism aimed at eliminating political dissent, else they could not exist. In China, such a mechanism is the Laogai. The Laogai, which translates literally from Mandarin Chinese to mean “reform through labor,” is China’s vast forced labor camp system and perhaps the most secretive and widely feared penal system in the world today.

Mao Zedong established the Laogai in 1950, although he was not the architect. Rather, the Laogai system is a model of the Soviet Union’s infamous Gulag. Through its methods of forced labor and regimented thought reform, the Gulag had buoyed the power of the Soviet Communists; Mao thus instituted the Laogai, a nearly identical system that would fortify Chinese Communist authority by “reforming counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries” into “new Socialist beings.”

While the Soviet Union’s Gulag has long been wiped out of Russian society, the Laogai thrives well into its 52nd year of existence as an untold number of prisoners continue to suffer behind the high walls and barbed fences of more than 1,000 camps. The Communist and Cultural Revolutions are over, yet only minor modifications in regulations mark the difference between the Laogai under Mao and the Laogai of today. While the majority of today’s inmates are incarcerated for reasons that have less to do with politics or class background, the Laogai still serves its intended political purpose: to protect and consolidate the Communist authority. Individuals deemed to be threats to the one-party system might be held for “crimes against state security” or “revealing state secrets.” Often some offenses that have the ring of more common crimes, such as hooliganism or arson, actually mask politically motivated incarceration.

This political function of the Laogai is helped significantly by China’s general lack of due process and disregard for rule of law. Well-documented reports of several human rights organizations have revealed a system where individuals are often convicted and sentenced without trial. Even when an individual can secure their right to trial, they are often refused the right to adequately defend themselves or they are convicted through evidence that was extracted through torture.

The grueling, punitive forced labor component of the Laogai, aside from presenting a means of physical punishment for prisoners, has proven to be a great source of financial gain for the Chinese government. During Deng Xiaoping’s rule and the creation of China’s “socialist market economy,” the Laogai became an efficient for-profit operation. Prisoner-produced goods from the Laogai have become a crucial part of China’s economy as they filter into foreign markets, including the United States. [...]

The legal definition of the Laogai entails six main components: prisons (jianyu), reform-through-labor detachments (laodong gaizao dui or laogai), reeducation-through-labor facilities (laodong jiaoyang suo or laojiao), detention centers (kanshou suo), juvenile offender facilities (shaoguan suo) and the practice of forced-job-placement personnel (liuchang jiuye renyuan). Other penal institutions akin to the Laogai are Custody and Repatriation (shourong qiansong), Shelter and Investigation (shourong shengcha) and psychiatric hospitals. [...]

In 1994, as a response to the increasing amount of humanitarian attention to abuses in the Laogai camps, the National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party promulgated a “Prison Law,” legislation that officially replaced the term “Laogai” with the term “Prison” (jianyu) in the lexicon of the Chinese legal and penal systems. An article in the January 7, 1995 edition of the official government publication Legal Gazette revealed the reasoning behind this game of semantics:

“Our renaming the Laogai is what our associating with the international community calls for, and it is favorable in our international human rights struggle . . . henceforth, ‘Laogai’ as a word will no longer appear, but the function, character and tasks of our prison administration will remain unaltered.”

Regardless of name, the Reform Through Labor system is in essence and in character everything it has always been since its conception in 1950."

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source:

History of the Laogai ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3749]

"The Laogai came into being as a result of a defense treaty signed by the Soviet Union and China in 1950. The Soviet Union, eager to share its authoritarian methods with its Communist ally, agreed to lend aid and assistance to China in the development of certain basic institutions of society, including a penal system modeled directly after the highly effective Gulag. This tutelage led to a blending of tenets from both Chinese and Soviet philosophies on reform to create what is the Laogai.

Under Mao Zedong’s direction and with help from Soviet experts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deeply rooted its nation-wide system of labor reform camps in Marxist-Leninist ideology. As with the Gulag, the Laogai became a “violent tool of suppression.” A primary purpose of the Laogai facility was to root out and isolate the vast numbers of political prisoners that resulted from the new regime’s consolidation of power. As Mao Zedong stated:

“Ours is a socialist state. A socialist state’s Laogai facilities - prisons, Laogai camps, Laojiao camps, and Juvenile criminal camps, all of them - are tools representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses in exercising dictatorship over a minority of hostile elements originating from exploiter classes.”

Such “hostile elements” referred to the ever-changing targets of political campaigns launched by the newly formed Communist government, including the members and supporters of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Government and members of the “enemy classes” such as landlords and wealthy businessmen. These and their families were labeled as “historical counterrevolutionaries.” Subsequent purges from within the CCP swelled the Laogai population, filling the camps with “rightists” and “leftists” alike, depending on the inconstant political winds.

The following documents, “Regulations on Reform through Labor” and “Temporary Disciplinary Methods for the Release of Criminals Completing their Terms and for the Implementation of Forced Job Placement” of 1954 and the 1957 “Reeducation through Labor Policies,” provided a quasi-legal basis for the Laogai. These documents also established the three primary institutions of the Laogai: Laogai (Reform Through Labor), Jiuye (Forced Job Placement) and Laojiao (Reeducation Through Labor). Yet regardless of such rhetoric, the early Communist China was a nation with virtually no organized laws or established judiciary. Chinese courts and Laogai camps cooperated to function as merely an appendage of the Communist Party. As went the popular Chinese saying of the time, “Policy is better than law, and leadership is better than policy.” It was not until after the death of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent “opening” of China that the nation was forced to develop some semblance of a legitimate legal system.

Because China’s opening was motivated more by a desire to improve economic development than to reform Mao’s political system, only a small number of laws relevant to the penal system emerged. Among these, the Criminal Law of the PRC was the most important. Signed into law in 1979, it detailed Laogai ideology, crime and punishment, the death penalty and three different categories of political offenses. These categories include the following: crimes of counterrevolution, crimes of endangering public security, and crimes of disrupting the order of social administration. This law defines “counterrevolutionary crimes” as the following:

“All acts endangering the People’s Republic of China committed with the goal of over-throwing the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system.”

The document continues to describe a veritable laundry list of specific “crimes” ranging from distributing leaflets to staging protests to revealing state secrets. The 1979 law code was also accompanied by a new code on criminal procedures specifying how cases were to be investigated and adjudicated according to the law.

The opening of China, Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power and a new legal transparency, however slight, gave great hope to survivors of Mao’s reign. Yet, while Deng’s rule indeed signified an end to the rampant violence and mass purges of the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party, to this day, has proven to be just as intolerant of dissent. With the brutal crackdown on participants of the Democracy Wall Movement in 1979, Deng set the standards for Chinese political life in the post-Mao era. Against a backdrop of modernization and reform in Chinese corporate law, dissidents are still detained illegally, deprived of legal representation, tortured, forced to labor, and have their sentences extended for political reasons. In short, they remain the victims of a regime that does not respect the rule of law.

Through the 1980’s, as China crept closer toward full integration in the international community, the prison camp system retained its political function, a function reiterated in the 1988 Chinese government document “Criminal Reform Handbook”:

“To define [Laogai] functions concretely, [Laogai camps] fulfill tasks in the following three fields: 1. Punishing criminals and putting them under surveillance. 2. Reforming criminals. 3. Organizing criminals in labor and production, thus creating wealth for society. Our Laogai facilities are both facilities of dictatorship and special enterprises.”

Several more legal reforms came in the 1990s, the most significant of these being the revised Criminal Code of 1997 and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1997. These two revised codes brought changes to provisions from the 1979 versions, although such alterations in language resulted in little progress in practice. For example, the section from the 1979 law that was entitled “Counterrevolutionary Crimes” was renamed “Crimes Against State Security,” and the previously stated definition of counterrevolutionary laws was deleted from the provisions. Far from indicating that activities previously considered “counterrevolutionary crimes” are now legal, this omission expands the scope of punishable acts to all those which fit the vague, undefined notion of “endangering state security.” Clearly, the Laogai, with its utter lack of respect for the rule of law is hardly a system to maintain order in society or to punish criminals in accordance with the law; its foremost purpose is to protect and consolidate the power of the Chinese Communist party."

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source: Laogai Research Foundation

"Thought reform" ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3750]

"A significant feature of the Laogai is its focus on thought reform (sixiang gaizao). It is this quality of the penal system that is unique to China alone; thought reform was never a part of the Laogai’s predecessor, the Gulag. In 1954, the People’s Daily published the first public statement on thought reform on behalf of the Party:

“All crimes have definite sociological roots . . . Thus if we are to wipe all crimes from their root, in addition to inflicting on the criminal the punishment due, we must also carry out various effective measures to transform the various evil ideological conceptions in the minds of the people so that they may be educated and reformed into new people.”

During the days of Mao, life in a Laogai camp was never without rigorous thought reform activities, including forced confessions, self-criticisms, “struggle sessions” during which inmates humiliated and criticized each other, and collective labor intended to break one’s will and encourage submission to Communist indoctrination. As Jean Pasqualini, a co-founder of the Laogai Research Foundation, wrote in his 1973 book Prisoner of Mao, often the aim of the prison authorities was “not so much to make you invent non-existent crimes, but to make you accept your ordinary life, as you led it, as rotten and sinful and worthy of punishment.”

Deng’s rise to power and the end of the Cultural Revolution bred new hope that the abusive practices of thought reform would become a thing of the past. Certainly the intense political study sessions of the Maoist era were curbed and eventually eliminated; however, thought reform still remains an integral part of the Laogai. Prisoners today still must confess and provide self-criticisms. They are stripped of their personal identity, having no choice but to accept only the persona they can be offered through the Communist Party. All criminals must renounce any political and religious beliefs that the state considers subversive. The Catholic Priests, Falungong followers, and democracy activists trapped in the Laogai today must all confess their “crimes” against the nation, recant their beliefs, and undergo special reeducation classes, which, according to recent reports, may incorporate torture. Group humiliation is also a well-known tenet of Laogai thought reform patterns. Prisoners are turned against one another and are forced to criticize and sometimes physically beat one another in struggle sessions. This again reinforces the isolation of the prisoner and the feeling that they will not become part of the group until they submit to the authorities and allow themselves to be “re-educated.”"

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Forced labor/prison conditions ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3751]

"Laogai prison camps house only the criminals who have completed the process of arrest, trial and sentencing. Laogai camps can be anything from factories, workshops, mines or farms within which all prisoners are forced to labor. Because authorities regard Laogai camps as “state secrets,” and most camps have alternate production unit names, it is difficult to say with certainty how many camps exist and where they are located.

While labor camp conditions vary from camp to camp, the only common factors of all camps regardless of location or political atmosphere is the following: all prisoners are forced to labor, undergo thought reform and submit to prison authorities. Appalling conditions persist in many camps. LRF researchers have confirmed sights where prisoners mine asbestos and other toxic chemicals with no protective gear, work with batteries and battery acid with no protection for their hands, tan hides while standing naked in vats filled three feet deep with chemicals used for the softening of animal skins, and work in improperly run mining facilities where explosions and other accidents are a common occurrence. Political prisoners are commonly housed together with other prisoners although there are numerous reports of solitary confinement. Reports of other forms of torture are also common and include beatings with fists and cattle prods, exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat, sleep deprivation, shackling and starvation. Leaders of the Falun Gong meditation sect claim that as of September 2, 2002, 466 of their members have died under such conditions in Laogai camps."

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Laodong Jiaoyang - Reeducation Through Labor ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3752]

"Commonly abbreviated as “Laojiao,” this branch of the Laogai system is one of the most effective means for the CCP to silence critics, punish political prisoners and deter dissent. Laojiao allows the Public Security Bureau to detain and sentence individuals for up to three years without any official charge, trial, or any other legal proceedings whatsoever. A variety of agencies and individuals, from family members to employers to the police, can recommend individuals to reeducation through a petition process. Most often, it is the local police who determine a reeducation term.

According to the 1957 law which created Laojiao, Laojiao is an administrative measure of reform through forced labor designed, “to reform idle able-bodied people who violate law and discipline and who do no decent work, into new people, earning their own living; it is also made in order to further strengthen social order and enhance socialist construction.” Laojiao camps are not included in any official accounting of the number of prisoners in the Laogai system. By the same logic, those in Laojiao camps are not considered convicted prisoners and, as such, are not protected under the international treaties for treatment of prisoners. Similarly, the goods they are forced to manufacture are not addressed by the bilateral agreements between the United States and Chinese governments banning the trade in forced labor products.

Under the 1979 amendments to the “Measures for Reeducation through Labor,” the following categories of people should undergo reeducation through labor:

“Counterrevolutionaries and anti-Party, anti-socialist reactionaries, whose crimes are minor and not subject to criminal prosecution, and who have been dismissed by government offices, organizations, enterprises, schools or other units and have no way to make a living.”

In subsequent publicly issued copies of these amendments, the language about political dissidents being subject to sentencing in Laojiao camps is deleted. Nevertheless, it is still clear that the Laojiao - with its complete bypassing of the trial process - remains a common and arbitrarily used tool for the Beijing government in its systematic efforts to eliminate all signs of dissent. In 1996, The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights declared Laojiao to be an unacceptable element of the Chinese penal system as per international law standards. According to this report:

“As a non-criminal sanction, reeducation through labor is subject to none of the procedural constraints set out in the CPL . . . Persons subject to these proceedings have no right to counsel or to a hearing, let alone a judicial determination of their obligations.”

A sharp increase in the construction of Laojiao facilities suggests that the system, proven to be an effective muzzle for those deemed hostile by the government, is becoming more and more relied upon. According to a July 2002 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there are currently 300,000 inmates in nearly 300 Laojiao camps throughout the country. A 1996 report issued by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and obtained by a Taiwanese publication, states that as of September 24, 1996, there were a total of 1.78 million inmates in Laojiao. Other official Chinese sources claim that since Laojiao’s implementation, 3.5 million people have been “reeducated” in a Laojiao facility.

The increasing demand by scholars for an abolition of Laojiao resulted in the February 2001 Seminar on Punishment of Minor Crimes, an event organized by both the Chinese government and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. There, the Chinese government announced its plans for changes in the basic structure of Laojiao, including alterations of its name, targets and general nature of implementation. While many would welcome improvements of Laojiao, it was a general disappointment to discover that China has no intention of ultimately ridding itself of Laojiao."

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Jiuye: Prisoners who are deemed "not well reformed" or potential recidivists may be forced to remain indefinitely in the Laogai camp where they completed their sentences ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3753]

"One of the most blatant human rights abuses of the CCP is Jiuye. According to Chinese government regulations and criminal theory, prisoners who are deemed “not well reformed” or potential recidivists may be forced to remain indefinitely in the Laogai camp where they completed their sentences. Essentially, Jiuye is the CCP’s “wild card”: regardless of sentence terms or lengths, the government reserves the right to assign a life sentence on a prisoner whom authorities are uncomfortable to release. Chinese law stipulates that the following individuals may be subject to jiuye:

“Criminals who are not well reformed should usually undergo forced job placement in the camp. They include: important counter-revolutionaries… who show no evident signs of repentance during their terms and may revert to crimes after completing their terms, and assaulting the socialist system, vilifying the Party’s line, principles, and policies… seriously violate reform regimen …those who consistently refuse to labor, or deliberately sabotage production and do not correct themselves despite repeated admonitions.”

Chinese law is very clear regarding the institution of Jiuye as an integral part of the Laogai system. Certain directives of the National People’s Congress in 1981 reiterated the circumstances under which prisoners can and should be detained in the Jiuye system:

“Persons who commit crimes within three years after release from reeducation-through-labor or within five years after escape from reeducation-through-labor shall receive strict punishment and lose their urban residence. After they serve their terms, they shall get jobs in the farms where they have received reeducation-through-labor. They also may lose their urban residence so that after they serve their term, they usually are required to obtain employment on the farm and be denied jobs in large or medium-sized cities.”

Jiuye policies most frequently apply to political prisoners by whom the government is most threatened. Later directives of Communist authorities prove this assumption:

“Criteria of the above-mentioned personnel who ‘fail to be well reformed’ should be handled strictly… The emphasis should be focused on those counterrevolutionaries and recidivist criminals who may revert to crimes after they are released and get back to society.”

Chinese documents also state that all “counterrevolutionary criminals” are subject to “unconditional Jiuye.” Indeed, an oft-quoted motto amongst political prisoners in the Laogai is, “There is an end to Laogai, but Jiuye is forever.”"

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Forced labor in detention centers ("Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction") [ID 3754]

"Detention centers house those awaiting trial or sentencing and criminals sentenced to less than two years. Detention centers also hold prisoners who are awaiting execution. All detainees, regardless of crime, sentence or lack thereof, are required by law to engage in forced labor.

Because these centers are governed locally and are in few instances patrolled by central authority, conditions will vary greatly. In some detention centers detainees are treated humanely and working conditions are manageable. Other reports however, confirm that some detention centers torture inmates and labor conditions remain harsh. Falun Gong practitioners claim that treatment is as severe as in labor camps, and several of their members have died in detention center custody. There are also reports of prisoners being shackled, beaten with electric cattle prods, and subject to mass overcrowding."

Document(s): Laogai Research Foundation: Laogai Handbook - Introduction

28.05.2008 - Source: Amnesty International

An estimated 500,000 people were subjected to punitive detention without charge or trial through “re-education through labour” and other forms of administrative detention ("Annual Report 2008") [ID 23540]

"People who peacefully exercised their rights such as freedom of expression and association remained at high risk of enforced disappearance, illegal and incommunicado detention or house arrest, surveillance, beatings and harassment.
An estimated 500,000 people were subjected to punitive detention without charge or trial through “re-education through labour” and other forms of administrative detention. Progress on legislation to reform “re-education through labour” remained stalled in the National People’s Congress. Police extended the use of “re-education through labour” and another form of administrative detention, “enforced drug rehabilitation”, to “clean up” Beijing in the run-up to the Olympics.
For an estimated 11-13 million people, the only practical channel for justice remained outside the courts in a system of petitioning to local and higher level authorities, where the vast majority of cases remained unresolved"

Document(s): Open document

11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Beating deaths occurred in administrative detention and reeducation-through-labor facilities ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22764]

"Many inmates in penal and reeducation-through-labor facilities were required to work, with minimal or no remuneration. In some cases prisoners worked in facilities directly connected with penal institutions; in other cases they were contracted to nonprison enterprises. Former prison inmates reported that workers who refused to work in some prisons were beaten. Facilities and their management profited from inmate labor.
[...]
Conditions in administrative detention facilities, such as reeducation-through-labor camps, were similar to those in prisons. Beating deaths occurred in administrative detention and reeducation-through-labor facilities."

Document(s): Open document

11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Administrative detention was used to intimidate political activists and prevent public demonstrations ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 22769]

"The law permits nonjudicial panels, called labor reeducation panels, to sentence persons without trial to three years in reeducation-through-labor camps or other administrative detention programs. The labor reeducation committee is authorized to extend a sentence up to one year. Defendants could challenge reeducation-through-labor sentences under the administrative litigation law and appeal for a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences. However, appeals rarely succeeded. Many other persons were detained in similar forms of administrative detention, known as "custody and education" (for prostitutes and those soliciting prostitutes) and "custody and training" (for minors who committed crimes). Administrative detention was used to intimidate political activists and prevent public demonstrations. Special reeducation centers were used to detain Falun Gong practitioners who had completed terms in reeducation-through-labor but whom authorities decided to continue detaining."

Document(s): Open document

11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Authorities denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 23363]

"Under the "staying at prison employment" system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps, authorities denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences. Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but were not permitted freedom of movement."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Labor reeducation panels ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 18966]

"The law permits nonjudicial panels, called labor reeducation panels, to sentence persons without trial to three years in reeducation-through-labor camps or other administrative detention programs. The labor reeducation committee is authorized to extend a sentence up to one year. Defendants could challenge reeducation-through-labor sentences under the administrative litigation law and appeal for a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences (see section 1.e.). However, appeals rarely succeeded. Many other persons were detained in similar forms of administrative detention, known as "custody and education" (for prostitutes and those soliciting prostitutes) and "custody and training" (for minors who committed crimes). Administrative detention was frequently used to intimidate political activists and prevent public demonstrations (see section 2.b.). A special form of reeducation centers was used to detain Falun Gong practitioners who had completed terms in reeducation through labor but whom authorities decided to continue detaining."

Document(s): Open document

01.2007 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Reeducation through labor (RTL) ("World Report 2007") [ID 18561]

"Long-discussed proposals to add a judicial component to “reeducation through labor” regulations also appear to have stalled."

Document(s): Open document

21.09.2006 - Source: Amnesty International

"Re-education through Labour" (RTL) continues to be used extensively in China ("The Olympics countdown – failing to keep human rights promises [ASA 17/046/2006]") [ID 19316]

""Re-education through Labour" (RTL) continues to be used extensively in China despite repeated calls from both inside and outside China for the system to be abolished. Amnesty International is concerned that the forthcoming Olympics Games may be acting as an incentive for the authorities to retain the system in the name of maintaining public order in Beijing.

Hundreds of thousands of people are believed to be held in RTL facilities across the country as a punishment for so-called minor offences which are not deemed serious enough to be punished under the Criminal Law. Periods of RTL, ranging from one to three years (extendable for a further year) are imposed by the police without charge, trial or judicial review. Chinese legal reformists have pointed out that these periods are much higher than minimum penalties under the formal Criminal Law and have raised serious concerns about the unchecked power of the police in imposing such punishments. Amnesty International is also concerned that those held in RTL facilities are at high risk of torture or ill-treatment, particularly if they refuse to acknowledge their ‘offending’ behaviour, recant their beliefs or resist ‘reform’. [...]

Attempts by the authorities to replace RTL with new legislation known as the "Illegal Behaviour Correction Law" (IBCL) have stalled. The law is reported to remain in draft stage within the legislative committee of the National People’s Congress, although no draft has been made publicly available. In May 2006, Amnesty International published a memorandum to the Chinese authorities analyzing the substance of the new law and assessing it against international human rights standards, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which China has signed and declared an intention to ratify in the near future.(28) The organization concluded that while the law contains some improvements compared with RTL, it still falls short of international standards in several crucial respects, in particular the failure to transfer responsibility for imposing punishments from the police to an independent court or tribunal. Amnesty International recommended that the authorities abandon attempts to introduce a new law, and instead bring all offences punishable with deprivation of liberty within the scope of the Criminal Law. [...]

In August 2003, an abusive form of administrative detention, "Custody and Repatriation" (shourong qiansong, C&R) was abolished in the wake of a public outcry over the brutal murder of migrant worker, Sun Zhigang, in police custody in Guangzhou. This system was used to target vagrants and others without fixed abode in the cities. Amnesty International welcomed this reform, noting that, like RTL, C&R could be imposed at the whim of the police without reference to the courts, and that torture and ill-treatment were frequently reported in such facilities. The organization is deeply concerned at apparent attempts by the Beijing authorities to use RTL as a substitute for C&R under the guise of cleaning up the city for the Olympics in 2008.

Amnesty International is also concerned about the continued existence of two other forms of punitive administrative detention imposed by the police in China: ‘Custody and Education’ (shourong jiaoyu), used to punish alleged prostitutes and their clients with between six months and two years’ administrative detention, and Enforced Drug Rehabilitation’ (qiangzhi jiedu), which enables the police to impose between three and six months’ detention for alleged drug addicts."

Document(s): Open document

20.09.2006 - Source: Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Reeducation through labour ("Annual Report 2006") [ID 17377]

see report for further details - Chapter V(b) and V(c)

"• Chinese authorities use reeducation through labor and other forms of administrative detention to circumvent the criminal process and imprison offenders for ‘‘minor crimes,’’ without judicial review and the procedural protections guaranteed by the Chinese Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded in 2004 that the Chinese government has made no significant progress in reforming the administrative detention system to ensure judicial review and to conform to international law. Although proposed reforms would provide some added procedural protections, they would still not provide an accused individual the opportunity to dispute the alleged misconduct and contest law enforcement accusations of guilt before an independent adjudicatory body.

[...]

• Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese administrative detention system. Authorities sentence some prisoners without judicial review to reeducation through labor (laojiao) centers, where they are forced to work long hours without pay to fulfill heavy production quotas, and sometimes are tortured for refusing to work. China’s Labor Law prohibits forced labor practices in the workplace, and authorities have arrested employers who trap workers at forced labor sites. In 2002, the Chinese government began to cooperate with the International Labor Organization on broad issues of concern regarding forced labor, including on potential reforms to the reeducation through labor system, and on improving institutional capacity to combat human trafficking for labor exploitation."

Document(s): Open document

12.05.2006 - Source: Amnesty International

Memorandum to the State Council and National People’s Congress concerning forms of punitive administrative detention imposed by the police ("Re-education through Labour" and detention imposed under the new Public Order Administration Punishment Law) on the occasion of the legislative review of "Re-education through Labour" ("Abolishing "Re-education through Labour" and other forms of punitive administrative detention: An opportunity to bring the law into line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ASA 17/016/2006]") [ID 17131]

Document(s): Memorandum
Press release

10.03.2006 - Source: UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights)

Advance edited version of report on situation concerning torture and ill-treatment, legal framework and prison conditions, forced "re-education", including individual cases ("Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak; Mission to China [E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6]") [#46990],  [ID 3736]

Document(s): Open document

10.03.2006 - Source: UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN Commission on Human Rights)

Methods used in the system of RTL often go beyond legitimate rehabilitation measures ("Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak; Mission to China [E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6]") [#46990],  [ID 20005]

"Many prisoners serving sentences for political crimes and detainees subjected to RTL who submitted complaints to the Special Rapporteur or whom he personally met in detention, claimed that the disproportionate, discriminatory and unjust deprivation of personal liberty (often for a very long period of time) together with the forced re education system to which they were subjected caused more severe pain and suffering than the physical torture they might have endured during interrogation by the police. Indeed, some of these measures of re education through coercion, humiliation and punishment aim at altering the personality of detainees up to the point of even breaking their will.
63. In response to the Special Rapporteur’s characterization of forced re education as a form of inhuman or degrading treatment, the Chinese authorities advanced several arguments in written comments of 25 January 2006 on the preliminary draft report, including that re education is premised on helping detainees re enter society and that since many detainees “are led to a life of crime because they love leisure and hate labour and resort to illegal means to gain others’ property”, prisons and re education through labour facilities organize appropriate work “in order to cultivate abilities and habits of self reliance and prevent problems such as poor mental health because they have nothing to do”. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur was informed that, in order to further enforce the law in a civilized manner, China’s Ministry of Justice Prison Bureau has begun training psychotherapists in the prison system with national professional accreditation in order to prevent and eliminate torture of prison inmates. According to China, “at present nearly 90 per cent of China’s prisons have begun this work and more than 1,000 prison system psychotherapists have already been trained”.
64. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, methods used in the system of RTL in China, and similar methods of re education in prisons, pretrial detention centres, and other institutions often go beyond legitimate rehabilitation measures provided for in article 10 of the ICCPR. Indeed, some of these measures strike at the very core of the human right to personal integrity, dignity and humanity, as protected by articles 7 and 10 of the ICCPR, as well as articles 1 and 16
of the CAT. RTL constitutes not only a serious violation of the human right to personal liberty, but can also be considered as a form of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, if not mental torture. RTL and similar measures of forced re education in prisons, pretrial detention centres, religious institutions and psychiatric hospitals should therefore be abolished."

Document(s): Open document

11.10.2005 - Source: Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Forced Labour ("Annual Report 2005") [#37506],  [ID 3737]

see report for further details

"Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese administrative detention system. A recent International Labor Organization report discusses prison labor without due process in Chinese re-education through labor (RETL) camps. At least 250,000 to 300,000 individuals are currently detained in approximately 300 centers in the RETL system. Although the Chinese government is in the process of reforming this system, it is unlikely to be abolished"

Document(s): Open document

21.09.2005 - Source: Amnesty International

Mao Hengfeng released on completion of her 18-month term of "Re-education through labour"; she was reportedly harassed and beaten ("People`s Republic of China - Further Information on UA 280/04") [#37162],  [ID 3738]

Document(s): Open document
Open document

04.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

Country Report April 2005 - Administrative Detention: "Re-education through Labour" (RTL) ("Country Report - April 2005") [#31975],  [ID 3739]

"Re-education through Labour (RTL)

5.89 As reported by the New York Times on 20 July 2004:

“Chinese law permits committees made up of police and local authorities to send prostitutes, drug addicts and others suspected of minor offenses to re-education through labor camps for up to three years without receiving a trial. Critics say the system locks up many who are innocent, denies due process, and is frequently used to punish political dissidents, labor organizers and others the Communist Party considers a threat to its authority… Because inmates are not formally considered criminals, they have little right to appeal their sentences.” [17b]

[...]

5.92 As reported by the Association for Asia Research (AFAR) on 12 September 2004, “During the National People’s Congress of 2004, 420 members of the committee signed a motion to abolish this system, which has been practiced for half a century.” According to the source, “The proposal to abolish labor camps brought a negative reaction from local authorities and police. The standing committee reportedly plans to rectify the legislation over the next five years. An expert close to the legislation department revealed that the National People’s Congress, the Court, the Procurator and some experts have reached a common understanding on the reform of the Chinese labor camp system. However, the most resistance came from the police department.” [19af]"

Document(s): Open document

04.2005 - Source: UK Home Office

Country Report April 2005 - Other Forms of Administrative Detention and Penalties ("Country Report - April 2005") [#31975],  [ID 3740]

"5.93 As reported by the Dui Hua Foundation in the Fall 2004 edition of their newsletter Dialogue, the following forms of administrative detention are also used in China:

• Custody and Education – intended to treat prostitutes and their clients, periods of detention range from six months to two years.
• Coercive Drug Rehabilitation – used to treat drug addicts.
• Legal Education – used to incarcerate people who have failed drug rehabilitation as well as “seriously poisoned” Falun Gong practitioners who have already gone through RTL.
• Custody and Repatriation – was used to hold migrant workers without papers until it was abolished in the summer of 2003. [...]


Other Forms of Administrtive Penalties

5.94 The Law on Administrative Penalty states:

“Article 8 Types of administrative penalty shall include:
(1) disciplinary warning;
(2) fine;
(3) confiscation of illegal gains or confiscation of unlawful property or things of value;
(4) ordering for suspension of production or business;
(5) temporary suspension or rescission of permit or temporary suspension or rescission of license;
(6) administrative detention; and
(7) others as prescribed by laws and administrative rules and regulations.

Article 9 Different types of administrative penalty may be created by law.
Administrative penalty involving restriction of freedom of person shall only be created by law.”"

Document(s): Open document

12.2004 - Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Comprehensive listing of Laogai camps, their "public" and internal names, locations, and details about number of prisoners and products produced ("Laogai Handbook") [#34397],  [ID 3741]

Document(s): Part 1
Part 2 Part 3 Part 4

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

USDOS: Forced labor ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11836],  [ID 3742]

"The law prohibits forced and bonded labor, and the Government denied that forced or bonded labor was a problem. However, forced labor was a problem in penal institutions. Prisoners regularly worked in prisons and reeducation-through-labor institutions. In some cases, prisoners worked in facilities directly connected with penal institutions; in other cases, they were contracted to nonprison enterprises. The economic benefits that penal institutions received from prisoners' work and the inconsistent application of standards of official accountability increased the chance that prison labor was coerced and abusive.

Some persons in pretrial detention also were required to work. Inmates of custody and repatriation centers, who were detained administratively without trial, were required to perform labor while in detention, often to repay the cost of their detention (see Section 1.d.). Most such inmates performed agricultural labor.

In 1992 and 1994, the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed agreements that allow U.S. officials, with the approval of the Government, to visit prison production facilities to check specific allegations that prisoners in these facilities have produced goods exported to the United States. Some, although not all, of these allegations claimed that these goods were produced under conditions of forced labor. Since these agreements were signed, the Government's cooperation with U.S. officials has been poor. Between 1997 and 2001, the Government allowed U.S. officials to conduct only one visit to a prison labor facility. During the year, limited progress was made with the initiation of regular meetings between U.S. Embassy and Ministry of Justice officials. Embassy officials conducted one prison visit during the year. However, the Government did not change its position that reeducation-through-labor facilities were not prisons, and no progress was made in allowing Embassy officials to visit them under the prison labor agreements.

Most anecdotal reports contended that working conditions in the penal system's light manufacturing factories were similar to those in other factories, while conditions in prison farms and in mines were often particularly severe. In May 2001, 39 prisoner-miners were killed in a coal mine flood in Sichuan Province. There were no comprehensive statistics for work-related deaths and injuries among prisoners.

The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but some child trafficking victims were reportedly sold into forced labor (see Section 6.f.)."

Document(s): Open document

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

USDOS: Inmates in the Xinhua Reeducation-Through-Labor Camp forced to work up to 16 hours per day; in 2000 reportedly several inmates died from overwork, poor medical care and beatings by guards ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11835],  [ID 3743]

"Forced labor in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps was common. At the Xinhua Reeducation-Through-Labor Camp in Sichuan Province, inmates were forced to work up to 16 hours per day breaking rocks or making bricks, according to credible reports. Former inmates reported that there were several deaths from overwork, poor medical care, and beatings by guards in 2000.

The Government did not permit independent monitoring of prisons or reeducation-through-labor camps, and prisoners remained inaccessible to international human rights organizations."

Document(s): Open document
text with hyperlinks

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

USDOS: 230,000 persons were in reeducation-through-labor camps according to official government statistics ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11835],  [ID 3744]

"Official government statistics indicated that there were 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps. According to a 2001 article by the official news agency, 300 reeducation-through-labor facilities have held more than 3.5 million prisoners since 1957."

Document(s): Open document
text with hyperlinks

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

USDOS: Persons incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps can be denied the permission to return to their homes or their home area after serving their sentences ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11836],  [ID 3745]

"Under the "staying at prison employment" system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps, authorities have denied certain persons permission to return to their homes after serving their sentences. Those persons sentenced to a total of more than 5 years in reeducation-through-labor camps on separate occasions also could lose their legal right to return to their home area. For those assigned to camps far from their residences, this practice constituted a form of internal exile. The number of prisoners subject to this restriction was unknown. Authorities reportedly forced other recently released prisoners to accept jobs in state enterprises where they could be closely monitored. Other released or paroled prisoners returned home but were not permitted freedom of movement. Former senior leader Zhao Ziyang remained under house arrest, and security around him was tightened routinely during sensitive periods. Zhao was allowed approximately one trip outside of Beijing per year."

Document(s): Open document

2002 - Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Overview of China's "Reeducation through Labour" camps, containing names and locations of the prisons (clickable chart) ("Laogai Camps of the People's Republic of China 2001-2002") [#19009],  [ID 3746]

Document(s): Open document

2000 - Source: Laogai Research Foundation

Comprehensive listing of Laogai camps, their "public" and internal names, locations, and details about number of prisoners and products produced ("Laogai Handbook") [#19039],  [ID 3747]

Document(s): Open document