01.2007 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Key International Actors ("World Report 2007") [ID 18578]

"In 2006 China was elected to the newly-formed UN Human Rights Council. Its candidacy statement asserted that “the Chinese government respects the universality of human rights and supports the UN in playing an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights.” However, Chinese diplomatic efforts have focused on doing away with independent UN investigations, on the grounds that “the internal affairs” of a state should not be subject to investigation. China continues to work closely with the “like minded” group of countries, which includes Iran and Zimbabwe, to roll back important human rights protections.

In August, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) faulted China for not having incorporated a legal definition for gender discrimination and for failing to act on the Committee’s previous recommendations.

China continues to maintain relations with and provide aid to a wide variety of countries, including Sudan and Burma. In 2006, China became the largest investor in Sudan’s oil sector but did not use its leverage to publicly press the government to end egregious human rights violations in Darfur or accept a UN force there, and blocked the imposition of targeted sanctions. China provided military assistance to Burma’s military junta, which continues to violently suppress civilians.

The Chinese government still refuses to cooperate with the UN special rapporteur on North Korea, and continues to assert that North Koreans are economic immigrants, not refugees. In the wake of Pyongyang’s October nuclear test, China took the highly unusual step of curtailing some of its fuel shipments to North Korea, indicating deep unease with Pyongyang’s behavior.

Although the European Union and others continued to pursue human rights dialogues with China in 2006, the sessions produced no concrete results and no further movement toward ratification by China of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR).

President Hu Jintao visited the United States in April 2006. Meetings with President Bush and other senior officials focused on business and shared security interests, addressing human rights issues in a largely ritualistic manner with no meaningful pressure for reform. The same pattern held when Premier Wen Jiabao attended the EU-China summit in Helsinki in September, then traveled to Germany and the UK for meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minster Tony Blair. Despite China’s intense lobbying, the EU refused to lift its arms embargo on China, imposed after the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in June 1989."

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23.05.2006 - Source: BBC News

Government extending military spending on aircraft, ships and missiles; Chinese force could pose threat across Asia, warns US report ("US warns against Chinese build-up") [ID 17168]

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19.04.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Analysis of the indifferent government position towards human rights and human rights violations, both nationally and internationally ("China's silence boosts tyrants") [#50102],  [ID 17140]

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01.2006 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Key International Actors ("World Report 2006") [#42330],  [ID 17340]

"China has taken an increasingly active role in international affairs in recent years, in a number of cases blocking independent U.N. investigations into country situations, asserting that the issues under discussion are “the internal affairs” of that country.  
 
At the U.N. Security Council, China was one of several countries initially unwilling to refer the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the International Criminal Court in 2005. In the end, rather than veto the measure, China abstained and the referral was made. China reportedly also has used its position on the council’s Sanctions Committee for Darfur to impede identification of individuals responsible for arms trade into and offensive military flights over Darfur.  
 
China also has played an important role in blocking the Security Council from addressing systematic human rights abuses by Burma’s military government. China is Burma’s largest investor and supplier of economic and military aid.  
 
In May 2005, two weeks after the Uzbek army killed hundreds of civilians in Andijan, Uzbekistan, the Chinese government greeted Uzbek’s president in Beijing with a twenty-one-gun salute and failed to endorse calls for an independent international investigation into the Andijan violence. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, composed of Russia, China, and four Central Asian states, characterized the Andijan incident as a terrorist plot.  
 
The Chinese government refuses to cooperate with the U.N. special rapporteur on North Korea and refuses to allow the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees access to border areas where most North Koreans reside.  
 
In 2005, the presidents of China and the United States met briefly in New York in August and in Beijing in mid-November. President Hu also met with Premier Paul Martin in Canada and with Prime Minister Tony Blair, representing the E.U., in Beijing and later in London. Although President Bush, in a speech in Kyoto, Japan on November 17, prodded China to extend political and religious freedoms and to embrace democracy, his Beijing agenda was long on economic and security concerns and short on human rights. Other Western governments’ preoccupations were similar. Exchanges with China over human rights have been largely relegated to ineffective bilateral dialogues.  
 
The United States did not table a resolution on China’s human rights practices at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2005, apparently in exchange for China’s willingness to cooperate with U.N. human rights mechanisms, among other steps. China extended an invitation to the U.N. special rapporteur on torture in 2005 but at this writing still had not extended one to the special rapporteur on religious freedom.  
 
Following his visit to China in October 2005, World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz singled out two non-economic factors, rule of law and participation of civil society, as important for economic development. Both are issues with important human rights aspects. The Bank expects to lend China between U.S.$1 billion to U.S. $1.5 billion a year for the next five years."

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11.10.2005 - Source: Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Annual report on compliance with human rights, development of rule of law and institutions of democratic governance, Tibet, North Korean refugees in China and developments in Hong Kong ("Annual Report 2005") [#37506],  [ID 3508]

"Growing Social Unrest and the Roots of Instability
Social unrest in China is growing. According to official Chinese statistics, the number of public protests in China increased every year between 1993 and 2004. In 2003, public security authorities reported 58,000 public protests involving more than 3 million people. In 2004, public security authorities reported 74,000 public protests involving more than 3.5 million people, and a seven-fold rise from the 10,000 protests recorded in 1994. In October 2004 alone, more than 2 million farmers reportedly took part in more than 700 protests.
Many problems fuel China’s social unrest. Unlawful land seizures and embezzled compensation payments led to numerous land disputes, with one Chinese social scientist warning of ‘‘turbulence’’ if the government does not solve these problems. Laid off workers and pensioners protested unpaid wages, poor labor conditions, and unemployment, with some incidents involving tens of thousands of protestors. Abusive police behavior sparked large-scale protests in Chongqing, Gansu, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Yunnan last year. Environmental degradation is also a growing cause of citizen protests. The number of collective petitioning efforts, involving hundreds or thousands of protestors trying to present their grievances to officials at successively higher levels of government, is growing. Public anger also manifests itself on the Internet, where reports on law enforcement abuse sometimes generate waves of media criticism and individual commentary.
[...]
The Leadership’s Counterproductive Response
[...]"

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11.10.2005 - Source: Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Developments in Hong Kong During 2005 ("Annual Report 2005") [#37506],  [ID 3509]

see report for further details - chapter VIII.

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05.09.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Continued often-violent protests by locals over corruption, land-grabs, taxation or environmental issues in rural areas; in response, security officials set up elite police squads in 36 cities to deal with riots and measures are taken to limit journalistic coverage of events ("China: Frustrated Citizens Take To The Streets") [#36267],  [ID 3510]

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02.09.2005 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

UN human rights chief rejects government's contention that feeding and clothing its population supersedes political freedoms ("UN Official: China Can't Go Its 'Own Way' On Rights") [#36216],  [ID 3511]

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02.02.2004 - Source: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Reform of China's Constitution planned: private property and human rights to be included (German) ("China vor Verfassungsänderung") [#19095],  [ID 3512]

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24.10.2003 - Source: Amnesty International

AI: China's reaction to the 11 September 2001 attacks ("China - Further Information on UA 119/02") [#17066],  [ID 3513]

"[...]
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, China has intensified its political crackdown, closing down mosques and branding those in favour of independence for the region as "ethnic separatists" or "terrorists". On 24 September 2003, the Chinese authorities publicly announced a renewed security crackdown in the XUAR which is due to last for 100 days from 1 October 2003 (National Day) to Chinese New Year in late January 2004. The authorities claim that the crackdown would target "violent crime, terrorist crimes, crimes involving explosives and guns and so on". There are concerns that it will lead to an intensified crackdown on peaceful political dissent in the region.
China is also putting pressure on neighbouring countries, such as Nepal, Pakistan and Central Asian countries, to repatriate Uighurs, including asylum seekers and refugees. Amnesty International believes that any Uighurs suspected of being involved in pro-independence groups or activities and perceived by the authorities to be "terrorists, separatists or religious extremists" would be at risk of serious human rights violations, including torture, detention without charge and execution, if forcibly returned to China."

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09.04.2003 - Source: Freedom House

Freedom House: Current Political Developments ("The world`s most repressive regimes 2003") [#12683],  [ID 3514]

"The ruling party’s carefully-scripted leadership changes, aimed at giving the impression of a smooth transition to a younger generation of leaders, ended up creating some uncertainty over who actually wields decisive power in the world’s most populous country. Hu Jintao, the sixty-year-old state vice president and an engineer by training, formally took the reigns of the all-powerful Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from veteran party boss Jiang Zemin, 76, at a November party congress. Jiang, however, held on to a key military post, leading to speculation that he intends to be a power broker behind the scenes. Regardless of who really is on top, the party is expected to continue its overarching policy of gradually freeing up the economy while crushing political dissent as it faces rising unemployment, widespread labor protests, and growing income inequalities.
[...]
the CCP’s sixteenth party congress in November— an event held only once every five years—was carefully stage-managed to project an image of an orderly transfer of power. Hu was named secretary-general of the CCP, reportedly having been tapped by Deng a decade ago as Jiang’s successor. Jiang is expected to also give up the state presidency to Hu when his term expires in March. Jiang continues, however, to head the Central Military Commission, a post that effectively keeps him in charge of China’s 2.5 millionman armed forces. By virtue of this position, Jiang, not Hu, is officially listed as the head of the new party leadership.
[...]
In addition to formally endorsing the new leadership lineup, the congress also approved Jiang’s controversial decision to allow private entrepreneurs to join the CCP."

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14.11.2002 - Source: BBC News

The most sweeping leadership change in over a decade is under way in China; Party chief Jiang Zemin and five other senior leaders are expected to step down from the Politburo ("Chinese leadership change under way") [#9604],  [ID 3515]

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16.08.2001 - Source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung

In order to maintain the dwindling power of the communist party, Jiang intends to modernise the party in favour of the "new social groups" which include businesspeople who should get access to the party [ID 3517]

"[...] Die Schliessung der Zeitschrift kann nur im Rahmen der Kampagne der «Drei Vertretungen» verstanden werden, mit der Jiang seit einiger Zeit versucht, sich selber ein Denkmal zu setzen und die Kommunistische Partei zu verändern. Laut diesem Gedankenmodell - noch ist es nicht offiziell in den Status einer Theorie erhoben worden - sollte die KP künftig nicht nur, wie es in der klassischen Doktrin der Fall ist, die Bauern und die Arbeiterschaft vertreten, sondern auch die «fortgeschrittenen Produktivkräfte» und die «fortgeschrittene Kultur». Mit diesen Termini aber können nur die neuen sozialen Gruppen aus Wirtschaft und Kultur gemeint sein, die sich in den ganz und gar nicht mehr kommunistischen chinesischen Gesellschaft in Spitzenpositionen gebracht haben. [...] Von Interesse bei diesem Sommertheater mit ernstem Hintergrund ist natürlich einmal mehr nicht der Inhalt, sondern die Form. Dass Jiang die Partei den Unternehmern öffnen und so die beträchtlich geschrumpfte Basis der KP verbreitern will, ist seit langem bekannt und lediglich ein weiterer Versuch der zunehmend ins soziale Abseits geratenden KP, ihren Herrschaftsanspruch aufrechtzuerhalten. Wesentlich bedeutungsvoller ist die Art und Weise, in der der Staatschef vorgeht: Er zensiert, er ordnet an, er straft. Damit macht er nolens volens klar, dass die KP sich zwar, der Not gehorchend, modernisiert, dass sie aber nicht im Entferntesten daran denkt, wahrhaft demokratische Formeln für Demokratie und nationalen Diskurs einzuführen. Willkür ist weiterhin der Stil der Partei. Die harschen Massnahmen Jiangs gegen «unmoderne» Altmarxisten - die der Lehre der Gründerväter schliesslich sehr viel näherstehen als die zum reinen Pragmatisten- Klub degenerierte Partei - verdienen deshalb etwa gleich viel Bewunderung wie die geschickt orchestrierten Freilassungen von Dissidenten."

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