10.2003 - Source: UK Home Office

Country Assessment - October 2003 - The Political System ("Country Report - October 2003") [#49232],  [ID 3548]

"5.4. China is a unitary state with political power held by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The highest organ of state power is the National People's Congress (NPC), which meets once a year in plenary session: but has a Standing Committee, which meets more frequently to scrutinise legislation. The NPC is composed of deputies elected for a five year term by local people's congresses of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Separately from this the five yearly Party Congress elects a Politburo and Standing Committee, which can be regarded as the Chinese cabinet.

5.5. Retired senior CCP leaders retain considerable power, however in mid1995, the top leadership announced that ultimate authority had been passed to the younger generation of leaders in the (currently) 24-member Politburo. The Politburo's Standing Committee has 9 members.

5.6. Attempts to establish political parties independent and critical of CCP's monopoly rule are crushed by the authorities. However, several hundred million Chinese have participated in the village election programme, which allows basic democratic expression in multi-candidate elections for non-governmental local village committees. Foreign observers have described these elections as on the whole fair. Successful village committee elections have included campaigning by multiple candidates and the use of secret ballots."

Document(s): Open document

10.2003 - Source: UK Home Office

Country Assessment - October 2003 - Democracy and Representation ("Country Report - October 2003") [#49232],  [ID 3549]

"Grassroots Political Activity in China

5.7. Formal channels of communication (such as the People's Congresses) can be very ineffective and the informal channels are therefore very active. In some areas, policy cannot be carried out unless informal groups are won over (such as in clan organisations' co-operation in “one-child policy” targets).

5.8. Political participation in rural areas is typified by little interest in the election of deputies to the People's Congress because of the remote, district-level nature of representation.

5.9. Increasingly since 1990, local rural government has seen different types of protest to perceived injustices. The methods available range from the legal, - of written statements, lodging formal complaints and administrative law suits - to the illegal, such as destruction of crops, protests and riots.

5.10. Formal contact with government officials, either individually or collectively, can be fraught with obstacles and even some retaliation, but peasants can express their views on matters.

Village Committee (VC) System

5.11. The Village Committee System emerged after the disintegration of the communes in the late 1970s. The earliest known Village Committees (VCs) were set up in Guangxi province around 1980 -1981; the development was reported to the authorities in Hechi prefecture and then on to Beijing. The enthusiastic endorsement by Peng Zhen, the vice-chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee ensured VCs were written into the Constitution.

5.12. Estimates vary as to how many VC elections are now held in the one million plus villages of PRC. Estimates vary from 25 to 51 per cent with the lower estimates probably the more accurate.

Neighbourhood Committees (jumin weiyuanhui)

5.13. The Neighbourhood Committee is the lowest tier of local urban government and since1999 has witnessed a drive to attract younger members, with an emphasis on business skills rather than ideological 'purity'. The committees' work involves monitoring the floating population of rural migrants, encouraging (and enforcing) the one-child policy and finding the unemployed work. Many committees are now overwhelmed and unravelling in the current economic climate.

Democracy and Representation in China

5.14. Rapid change in the eastern coastal districts (including Fujian) since the mid1980s have lead to dramatic improvements in the villagers' lives in these provinces. The central government has been keen to stimulate similar growth in the central and western belts of China. And the local authorities in the centre / west have been under pressure to carry out developmental programs but have had to rely upon their sole and usual source of tax revenue - the rural villager. So a cycle of discontent has evolved with widespread tax evasion and harassment of officials."

Document(s): Open document

09.04.2003 - Source: Freedom House

Freedom House: Political Rights and Civil Liberties ("The world`s most repressive regimes 2003") [#12683],  [ID 3550]

"China is one of the most authoritarian states in the world. Opposition parties are illegal, the CCP controls the judiciary, and ordinary Chinese enjoy few basic rights.

The CCP Politburo’s Standing Committee makes nearly all key political decisions and sets governmental policy. Party cadres hold nearly all top national and local governmental, police, and military posts. China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, is constitutionally the most powerful state body. Its handpicked delegates now routinely register protest votes over the government’s handling of crime and other issues. For the most part, though, the congress merely rubber-stamps the Politburo’s decisions.

China’s only real experiment with democracy has been at the local level, mainly with elections for so-called village committees. These bodies, however, cannot levy taxes, and they hold few executive powers. Moreover, “In general the CCP dominates the local electoral process, and roughly 60 percent of the members elected to the village committees are CCP members,” according to the U.S. State Department’s global human rights report for 2001, released in March 2002. More recently, however, tens of thousands of villages have held elections for the more powerful position of local party secretary, a party researcher told the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review."

Document(s): Open document

09.04.2003 - Source: Freedom House

Freedom House: Political Situation Overview ("The world`s most repressive regimes 2003") [#12683],  [ID 3551]

"The ruling party’s carefully-scripted leadership changes, aimed at giving the impression of a smooth transition to a younger generation of leaders, ended up creating some uncertainty over who actually wields decisive power in the world’s most populous country. Hu Jintao, the sixty-year-old state vice president and an engineer by training, formally took the reigns of the all-powerful Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from veteran party boss Jiang Zemin, 76, at a November party congress. Jiang, however, held on to a key military post, leading to speculation that he intends to be a power broker behind the scenes. Regardless of who really is on top, the party is expected to continue its overarching policy of gradually freeing up the economy while crushing political dissent as it faces rising unemployment, widespread labor protests, and growing income inequalities.
[...]
the CCP’s sixteenth party congress in November— an event held only once every five years—was carefully stage-managed to project an image of an orderly transfer of power. Hu was named secretary-general of the CCP, reportedly having been tapped by Deng a decade ago as Jiang’s successor. Jiang is expected to also give up the state presidency to Hu when his term expires in March. Jiang continues, however, to head the Central Military Commission, a post that effectively keeps him in charge of China’s 2.5 millionman armed forces. By virtue of this position, Jiang, not Hu, is officially listed as the head of the new party leadership.
[...]
In addition to formally endorsing the new leadership lineup, the congress also approved Jiang’s controversial decision to allow private entrepreneurs to join the CCP."

Document(s): Open document