02.07.2008 - Source: Freedom House

Judicial branch is subject to political pressure from the executive branch and suffers from considerable corruption ("Freedom in the World 2008") [ID 24551]

"The judicial branch is subject to political pressure from the executive branch and suffers from considerable corruption. Police make arbitrary arrests without warrants, beat detainees during arrest and interrogation, and use torture to extract confessions. Cases of abuse go unreported out of fear of retribution. Prison conditions in Armenia are poor, and threats to prisoner health are significant."

Document(s): Open document

10.10.2007 - Source: Armenialiberty

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Hammarberg admitted that there are people unjustifiably detained for various reasons ("CE Commissioner: ‘there are people in prison who shouldn’t be there’") [ID 21532]

Document(s): Open document

06.2007 - Source: Freedom House

Judicial branch is subject to political pressure from the executive branch; police abuse ("Freedom in the World 2007") [ID 20479]

"The judicial branch is subject to political pressure from the executive branch and suffers from considerable corruption. In 2006, Justice Minister David Harutiunian outlined an ambitious proposal to enhance the independence of the judiciary and the country’s law enforcement sector, although these reforms had not been advanced by the end of 2006. Police make arbitrary arrests without warrants, beat detainees during arrest and interrogation, and use torture to extract confessions. Cases of abuse go unreported out of fear of retribution. Prison conditions in Armenia are poor, and threats to prisoner health are frequent."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Detainees must obtain permission from police or the prosecutor's office in order to obtain a forensic medical examination needed to substantiate a report of physical abuse ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 20110]

"By law detainees may file complaints prior to trial to address alleged abuses committed by authorities during criminal investigations; however, detainees must obtain permission from police or the prosecutor's office in order to obtain a forensic medical examination needed to substantiate a report of physical abuse. Human rights NGOs reported that authorities rarely granted such permission (see section 1.e.). There were no prosecutions or convictions of police for torture or other mistreatment during the year. Police conducted 18 internal investigations of complaints of brutality by their officers, but information on the outcome of these investigations was not available at year's end."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

Courts remained subject to political pressure from the executive and legislative branches ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 20190]

"The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, despite structural changes implemented during the year that led to somewhat greater independence, courts remained subject to political pressure from the executive and legislative branches, and judicial corruption was a problem."

Document(s): Open document

06.03.2007 - Source: US Department of State

The president exercised dominant influence over the judiciary ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2006") [ID 20194]

"The president exercised dominant influence over the judiciary, including over the appointment and dismissal of judges and chairmen of courts on all levels. He has the authority to make appointments based on the recommendations of the Judicial Council, the supreme judicial body in the country, which previously consisted of nine judges, two legal scholars, and three prosecutors, all of whom he also appointed. The judicial reforms that took effect on July 1 significantly reduced the president's power to appoint members of the Judicial Council. He subsequently had the right to appoint only two of a 13‑member body; the other members are either appointed by the National Assembly or elected by a General Assembly of Judges by secret ballot. The Constitutional Court is the only other exception to presidential dominance in judicial appointments; he appoints only four of its nine judges.
On December 22, the Court of Cassation took the highly unusual decision of voiding two lower court decisions on the grounds that the original investigation had not been conducted lawfully (see section 1.c.).
Even with these changes, however, the judiciary was still far from independent. The Ministry of Justice remained responsible for the administration of judicial exams, the disciplining of judges, and the development of legislation relating to judicial functioning."

Document(s): Open document

08.05.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Judicial reforms did not touch upon the issue of corruption and the influence of politicians ("Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia") [#12599],  [ID 2913]

"The judicial reforms did not touch upon the issue of corruption and the influence of politicians on the courts. In practice, however, they seemed to play an important role for example in appointments of judges: many officers of the Justice Ministry were appointed judges of the Court of Appeal and chairmen of the courts of first instance. Generally, it was believed that judges must pay a large sum to have a positive attestation to work as a judge. Bribery was a growing problem, which was also evident in the growing number of complaints about it to the Helsinki Association; people were required to pay bribes to simply get their cases settled. However, there was not a single known case of proceedings for bribery against judges. The recent reforms allowed defense lawyers to work independently. After passing a test prepared by the Justice Ministry, a defense lawyer was obliged to become a member of one of the two bar associations. However, court rulings subject to appeal could be handled only by about ten defense lawyers specially authorized for this purpose. Merely to appeal for such authorization cost about €500. [...] Although judicial reforms provided for prompt court proceedings, they did not show any improvements in practice. Primarily, the delays could be attributed to the poor labor discipline of the prosecution that often failed to appear in sessions at the right time, the late opening of sessions and short hours (e.g. sessions only on three days a week at the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation), the lack of space for the higher level courts, and poor organization (leading, for example, to judges being appointed to two different trials taking place at the same time)."

Document(s): Open document

08.05.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Lack of qualified judges ("Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia") [#12599],  [ID 2914]

"In practice, judges were directly dependent on the executive power, in particular of the minister of justice who drew up lists for appointments for judges and decided whether they had sufficient qualifications. The list then went to the Council of Justice that submitted the final list of candidates to the president of Armenia for approval. The Council of Justice, presided by the president, exercised the right to discipline and dismiss judges. Other members of the council were the minister of justice and the prosecutor general. Judges were appointed for a life term, but could in practice be dismissed solely on personal reasons; for example, the prosecutor could address a letter to the Council of Justice reporting alleged mistakes committed by a judge, the council could consider the issue and submit a proposition to the president to dismiss the judge. There was a lack of qualified judges, which became particularly evident after the Justice Ministry decided to renew the courts’ staff. The move resulted in a lack of practical experience and professionalism amongst candidates, which brought an array of protests to the Court of Appeal on the decisions of the courts of first instance."

Document(s): Open document

08.05.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Corruption and influence of politicians on the courts ("Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia") [#12599],  [ID 2915]

"The judicial reforms did not touch upon the issue of corruption and the influence of politicians on the courts. In practice, however, they seemed to play an important role for example in appointments of judges: many officers of the Justice Ministry were appointed judges of the Court of Appeal and chairmen of the courts of first instance. Generally, it was believed that judges must pay a large sum to have a positive attestation to work as a judge. Bribery was a growing problem, which was also evident in the growing number of complaints about it to the Helsinki Association; people were required to pay bribes to simply get their cases settled. However, there was not a single known case of proceedings for bribery against judges."

Document(s): Open document

08.05.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Big discrepancies between sentences by different courts and judges for the same crime ("Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia") [#12599],  [ID 2916]

"The sentencing policy was not just. The sentences were generally harsh (in criminal cases usually imprisonment), but there were big discrepancies between sentences handed down by different courts and judges for the same crime. The work of the Public Prosecutor’s Office was politically motivated when it came to initiating criminal proceedings."

Document(s): Open document

08.05.2003 - Source: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

Preventive punishment ("Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Armenia") [#12599],  [ID 2920]

"When deciding on preventive punishment (taking into custody suspected persons and deciding on their possible release on bail or upon a written undertaking not to leave a location), the courts were not entitled to investigate evidence but had to base their decision entirely on the account brought by the investigative agencies."

Document(s): Open document

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

Appointment of jugdes ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11840],  [ID 2917]

"The selection of judges is often based on scores on a multiple-choice test to determine potential judges' fitness under the system, and on their interviews with the Minister of Justice. The list of nominations is then approved by the Council of Justice and, finally, by the President. Judges are subject to review by the President, through the Council of Justice, after three years; unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, they are tenured until they reach the age of 65.
Prosecutors continued to greatly overshadow defense lawyers and judges during trials. Under the Constitution, the Council of Justice, headed by the President, the Procurator General, and the Justice Minister, appoints and disciplines judges for the tribunal courts of first instance, review courts, and the Court of Appeals. The President appoints the other 14 members of the Justice Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges. This authority gives the President dominant influence in appointing and dismissing judges at all levels."

Document(s): Open document

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

Constitution's provisions do not insulate the courts fully from political pressure ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11840],  [ID 2918]

"The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the Constitution's provisions do not insulate the courts fully from political pressure, and in practice, courts were subject to pressure from the executive and legislative branches and some judges were corrupt. Lengthy public trials sometimes were a problem."

Document(s): Open document

31.03.2003 - Source: US Department of State

No military court system ("Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002") [#11840],  [ID 2919]

"The military legal system operates essentially as it did during the Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same functions as their civilian counterparts, and operate in accordance with the Soviet-era Criminal Code. The Military Prosecutor, who was also named Deputy Prosecutor General, was in charge of the investigation into the October 1999 shootings in Parliament. By year's end, the trial of 11 detainees implicated in the crime continued. The Military Prosecutor has been strongly criticized by relatives of the victims and opposition political parties for reported defects in his investigation of the crime, but had refused demands in 2001 to resign."

Document(s): Open document

28.11.2002 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

No fully provided independence of the judiciary ("8th European Country of Origin Information Seminar Vienna, 28 - 29 June 2002: Final Report - Armenia - co-funded by the EU Odysseus Programme") [#9877],  [ID 2921]

"To add to the above, under the current legal framework judges are appointed by the Judicial Council, whose members are appointed by the president. This again reflects negatively on the independence of the judiciary. In everyday life, corruption, bribing and extortion of money are so common that most people pay without thinking or complaining about it. Certainly, if it concerns larger amounts of money or other excesses by law enforcement officials than bribe-taking, the victims could be more inclined to turn to the courts for help. In some cases support by an influential NGO may help the victim achieve a favourable verdict or a friendly settlement. Yet, the actual outcome is very hard to determine and depends on the magnitude of the problem and if e.g. political elements are involved. Ultimately, although there are initiatives to improve the situation, at the moment, corruption remains endemic and the impartiality of the judiciary is not guaranteed."

Document(s): Arm-cois2002-rep.pdf

10.2002 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Judiciary not independet ("Analysen und Hintergründe ") [#10328],  [ID 2922]

"Die Verfassung von 1995 garantiert die Unabhängigkeit und Entpolitisierung des Gerichtswesens. Tatsächlich aber ist die Judikative trotz der 1998 durchgeführten Justizreformen weiterhin die abhängigste und am schwächsten entwickelte bzw. am meisten von der Exekutive abhängige Gewalt: An der Spitze des Justizwesens steht der Rat der Gerichtspräsidenten, dessen Vorsitzender der Präsident der Republik ist, mit dem Justizminister und dem Generalstaatsanwalt als Stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden. Zu den Aufgaben des Rates gehört die Prüfung von Beschwerden über Richter sowie die Überprüfung der gerichtlichen Aktivitäten. Nach nichtamtlichen Quellen soll der Rat der Gerichtspräsidenten im Jahr 2000 585 Beschwerden geprüft haben. Der Rat sowie das Justizministerium führen ein bis Ende 2004 laufendes Reform- und Ausbildungsprogramm zur Verbesserung des Justizwesens und der öffentlichen Verwaltung durch, dessen Kosten im Wesentlichen die International Development Association trägt."

Document(s): Open document