Source:

Bernt Glatzer: Majority of Hazara adhere to the Imami Shiite confession [ID 1570]

"The Hazara are another ethnic group whose members play a major role in the civil war. They are now estimated to number 1.5 million. A majority adhere to the Imami Shiite confession ('Twelver Shia'); minorities among them are Ismaili and Sunni. The Hazara speak their own Persian dialect, Hazaragi, and are geographically concentrated in the Central Afghanistan highlands, in an area called the Hazarajat. Sizeable groups live also in various parts of northern Afghanistan, and in the major cities, particularly in Kabul, in the poorest sector of the society; as well as in Quetta (Pakistan) and Mashhad (Iran). The Hazara are identified by the other Afghans as one ethnic group recognisable by their prevailing Central Asian phenotype. Before the war I found the Hazara reluctant to name themselves 'Hazara', maybe because in Kabul Hazara has the connotation of 'very poor' or 'coolie'. The war has changed this attitude; decades of independence from Kabul have led to a remarkable ethnic self-confidence.
European anthropologists who visited the Hazara before the war even questioned their ethnic unity. A large block among the Hazara are the Sayids, who form their spiritual and political élite. The Sayids believe themselves to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammad and thus separate themselves from the commoners. The latter subdivide themselves into many tribes and clans but without an overarching genealogy. Modern Hazara nationalists claim descent from Chinggis Khan, thus hoping to raise the social status of the Hazara within the Afghan value system of social groups. A unifying factor is their popular dislike of Pushtuns. The Afghan Government in the 1880s and 1890s subdued the Hazara with a Pushtun army and allotted the best agricultural and pastoral land to Pushtun clans and chiefs. From that time until 1978, Pushtuns intruded into the Hazarajat as administrators, merchants, money lenders, landlords and nomads-in short, as persons who came to extract resources from the Hazarajat but who gave little in return. The Hazarajat liberated itself from the communist regime in 1979; one of the free Hazaras' first actions after that was to deny all Pushtuns access to Central Afghanistan. As a consequence Pushtun nomadism suffered a dramatic decline because it depended to a large part on summer pastures in that part of the country.
The former mosaic of political parties among the Hazara reflects their initial lack of unity, their parties ranging from ultraconservative mullah-networks (Shura-i Ettefaq) to moderate conservatives and to modern Islamist radicals (Nasr), and even to Maoist parties. Pressure from Iran, which supported most of the Hazara parties, and pressure from their adversaries in the post-1992 civil war drove them together politically. Today we hear only of the pro-Iranian Hezb-e Wahdat ('Party of Unity'). The recent successes in Wahdat's battles against the Taliban in Ghorband, Wardak and Mazar indicate a Hazara unity which never had existed before. If this tendency continues the Hazara may become the first major ethnic group in Afghanistan which is able to act as a coherent unit."

Source:
Dr. Bernt Glatzer: Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration? In: William Maley: Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, London 1998, p- 167-181"

Source:

Hazara.net ("Hazara.net") [ID 1577]

Hazara relevant information: press articles, human rights reports, Hazara organizations

Document(s): Hazara.net

Source:

Hazara.net: Who are the Hazara? ("Hazara.net - Who are the Hazara?") [ID 1578]

Document(s): Hazara.net - Who are the Hazara?

Source:

Hazara.net: Women of Hazarajat ("Hazara.net - Women of Hazarajat") [ID 1579]

Document(s): Hazara.net - Women of Hazarajat

05.2004 - Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Hazarajat as an area of low economic potential ("Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods (Author: Ian Christoplos)") [#25390],  [ID 1567]

"Hazarajat is a poor and isolated mountainous region of central Afghanistan with relatively little arable land. Crops (primarily wheat) are mostly produced in narrow irrigated valleys, with some rain-fed crops being planted on surrounding hillsides when precipitation permits. The mountainous topography makes transport difficult and puts Hazarajat’s agriculture at a disadvantage in accessing urban (Kabul) markets. Hazarajat is a chronic food deficit area. Livelihoods are heavily dependent on sales of livestock and migration to make up for this deficit. Hazarajat is known for its out-migration, both to Kabul and internationally. Iran is the preferred destination, since many Hazara are Shi’a and feel safer among people of their own religion. Some areas have had a pattern of seasonal migration, mostly to Kabul, during the winter months.
The isolation of Hazarajat has by no means meant that farmers are hesitant about trying new technologies. Poppy cultivation is currently expanding “spectacularly,” even to areas where it has never been grown before. Potato production is also expanding rapidly. This year potatoes are a major commercial crop, used in rotation with winter wheat. There is a readiness to invest in new machinery as well, as exemplified by some farmers purchasing mechanical threshers after observing a project managed threshing pilot.
Hazarajat’s small and isolated valleys display extraordinary diversity in terms of local socio-economic relations and impact from conflict and drought. In some districts extreme “feudal” relations exist. In other districts and valleys, sharecroppers have regained direct ownership of their land as former Kuchi landlords have fled. Many commanders are adapting to the coming of peace to the province by becoming landlords through land grabbing and other abuse of their power. Current analyses emphasise the massive impact of the drought on agriculture in Hazarajat, which devastated agricultural production. The uncertainties surrounding rain-fed agriculture in Hazarajat and skewed land ownership suggest that livestock is a more viable production strategy for the poor than crops. Some agency representatives acknowledge this. Subsidised veterinary services are, however, the only aid response under way. On a national level, some have called for “aggressive post-drought programs to restore livestock bases.” However, there is a lack of surplus animals throughout Afghanistan and with the extremely weak inspection and quarantine structures, imports from neighbouring countries would be very risky.
Hazarajat has attracted a considerable number of agencies over the years, but most have had relatively small programmes. One observer writes that, during the 1990s, “…at no stage has the volume of assistance, by any measure, been significant relative to the scale of the area economy.” Agricultural programming remains primarily oriented to seed distribution. Oxfam and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) are engaged in major long-term rural development programmes, both of which are struggling to refocus efforts away from the past seed focus. They are both experiencing difficulty in renegotiating operational relationships with the shuras with which they work. FAO is starting to implement a large and ambitious DFID-financed programme focused on enhancing rural livelihoods through first developing shuras and other institutions to act as farmer organisations. (p. 19 Box 1)"

Document(s): Open document

31.12.2003 - Source: Minorities at Risk

University of Maryland - Minorities at Risk: Background Information ("Assessment for Hazaras in Afghanistan") [#30494],  [ID 1180]

"The Hazara, who speak Farsi, are Shi`i Muslims (primarily Twelver, but also some Ismaili) who occupy the central highlands (the Hazarajat) of Afghanistan. Hazaras settled in other areas of Afghanistan as early as the 13th century and were forced into their current location by Pashtun and Sunni expansionism in the 18th and 19th century. Their status – political, economic and cultural – has been precarious in modern history due to their being both an ethnic and a religious minority. They are primarily sedentary farmers who also engage in some herding. Urban populations of Hazara tend to occupy the lowest economic rungs.
Economically marginalized, the Hazara began to organize politically in the 1960s and 1970s. During the Soviet occupation, they rebelled for political autonomy and achieved in the 1980s a high degree of independence in return for not attacking the Communist government in Kabul. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989, however, saw a return of the Hazara’s precarious position, especially vis-a-vis Pashtun political groups.
Represented primarily by the party Hizb-i-Wahdat (ORGCOH94=7), the Hazara aligned with the United Front (or Northern Allliance) after the takeover of the country by the primarily Pashtun Taliban in 1996 as a full-scale civil war erupted (REB96, REB97, REB98 = 7). The political goals of the Northern Alliance focus on creating a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups in a more federalized structure. The Taliban rejects this formula, instead focusing on the incorporation of the political opposition (without regard to ethnic formulas) into a Taliban-centered government structure that is more highly centralized.
Hazara regions have been a major battleground in the Afghan civil war. Their location in the center of the country, between Pashtun-dominated and Tajik-dominated regions, makes them vulnerable to attacks and frequent changes of controlling authority. Hazaras also seem to be targeted disproportionately by the Taliban for reprisals, probably because of their religious identity as Shi`i Muslims. Several massacres of Hazara civilians were reported in 1998, 1999 and 2000. However, a 1998 agreement between Hazara faction leader Hujjat-al-Islam Sayyid Mohammad Akbari and the Taliban has left some administration of some areas of Hazarajat, nominally under Taliban control, in the hands of ethnic Hazaras.
The Hazara receive external support from Iran. Iranian support makes them a target of Taliban repression (since the Taliban considers Iran a regional threat with ulterior motives vis-a-vis Afghanistan). However, given Iran’s regional status and power, Iranian patronage may also provide Hazaras with some degree of protection as well.
Several peace processes, mainly sponsored by the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have faltered and failed to have a positive impact on the Afghan civil war. The Taliban, who insist on a Taliban central government even if incorporating some dissident political groups, feel little need to acquiesce to international pressure since they control 90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory and enjoy the support of regional powers Pakistan and Saudi Arabia"

Document(s): Open document

31.12.2003 - Source: Minorities at Risk

Minorities at Risk: Urban populations of Hazara tend to occupy the lowest economic rungs ("Assessment for Hazaras in Afghanistan") [#30494],  [ID 1571]

"The Hazara, who speak Farsi, are Shi`i Muslims (primarily Twelver, but also some Ismaili) who occupy the central highlands (the Hazarajat) of Afghanistan. Hazaras settled in other areas of Afghanistan as early as the 13th century and were forced into their current location by Pashtun and Sunni expansionism in the 18th and 19th century. Their status – political, economic and cultural – has been precarious in modern history due to their being both an ethnic and a religious minority. They are primarily sedentary farmers who also engage in some herding. Urban populations of Hazara tend to occupy the lowest economic rungs."

Document(s): Open document

11.2003 - Source: Minority Rights Group International

Situation of Hazara under the Taliban ("Afghanistan: The Search for Peace") [#26698],  [ID 1566]

"Other groups, such as the Hazaras, have been more traditionally marginalized in Afghan society. The Hazaras are thought to be descendants of the Mongol tribes who once devastated Afghanistan, and are said to have been left to garrison the country by Genghis Khan. The Hazaras have often faced considerable economic discrimination – being forced to take on more menial jobs – and have also found themselves squeezed from many of their traditional lands by nomadic Pashtuns. Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, successive Pashtun leaders pursued active policies of land colonization, particularly in the northern and central regions, rewarding their supporters, often at the expense of the Hazaras. This policy was partially reversed during the Soviet occupation, but started again under the Taliban.
A Hazara-backed political party/militia group, Hisb-e-Wahdat, had sought to expand its influence when the Mujahidin captured Kabul in 1992. The Hazaras are Shi’a and Wahdat had been formed as a result of an initiative by the Iranian government. They were opposed on this occasion by a Saudi-backed Pashtun militia, Ittihad-i-Islami, and eventually driven back from the city after suffering heavy casualties.
Five years later the Hazaras helped to inflict a significant defeat on the Taliban in the northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif. Thousands of Hazara civilians were systematically murdered in retaliation when the Taliban finally recaptured Mazar in 1998. The Taliban also murdered a number of Iranian diplomats at the same time. The following three years also saw a number of ethnically based killings during fighting between the Taliban and the predominantly Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara militias who together now formed the Northern Alliance. Hazara civilians were massacred by the Taliban at Robatak Pass in 2000 and Yakawlang in 2001"

Document(s): Open document

18.09.2002 - Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region District Profiles: District Bamyan (Bamyan) ("UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region District Profiles: District Bamyan (Bamyan)") [#12364],  [ID 1175]

"Mr. Khalili, leader of Hezb-E-Whadat Party, is based in Bamyan City. In March 2002, Mr. Ali Yarzada(Hazara), a former commander of Whadat Party in Yakawlang, was officially appointed as Governor for Bamyan Province. In the same period, Mr. Fahimi(Hazara), has taken the position of Head of Police department for the Province, Mr. Jowari ( Hazara) as security commander and Mr. Frootan(Tajik) as General Attorney. In February 2002, Mr. Ali Mirzai(Hazara) was appointed as the representative of the ministry of External Affairs and as the focal point of humanitarian affairs. 16 Community fora have been established in Bamyan Centre, to palliate the absence of community structures.

Bamyan District has a total of 191 villages. Bamyan city, the administrative capital, is located at an altitude of about 2500 meters.
Bamyan was exposed to heavy fighting during the conflict that opposed in 1995 the Hezb-E-Whadat to Tajiks and from 1998 to 2001, Hezb-e Wahdat to Taliban. Many houses have been destroyed, the bazaar has been entirely burned down. Many abuses against civilians were reported and, by 1999, an average of 27 families per villages have left Bamyan, and 80 % of the residents of Bamyan centre were displaced mainly to Wardak and Kabul. Most of the IDPs have returned to their village of origin since November 2001 Bamyan has been one of the first districts in the Central Region where humanitarian agencies have been able to resume activities since the end of November 2001. Humanitarian agencies have joined their effort to provide immediate relief assistance to recent returnees, IDPs and vulnerable population in the area.
The area is poor, and affected by the long lasting drought that has stricken Bamyan Province. Many parts of the district are inaccessible for most part of the year due to the bad road conditions and the snow. Security situation in the district can be considered good, mainly in Bamyan city."

Document(s): Open document

09.08.2002 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

IWPR: Hazara hope Khalili's new position as vice-president will improve local conditions ("Local Hopes Riding on Khalili") [#30674],  [ID 1572]

"Residents of Bamyan province, one of the most deprived regions of the country, are hoping their leader’s decision to take up a government post in Kabul will lead to an improvement in local conditions.

They believe that Hizb-e-Wahdat chief Abdul Karim Khalili, who recently became vice-president in the transitional administration, will ensure that more money and resources are channeled into the area.

Khalili - one of the first warlords to be appointed to President Hamed Karzai’s cabinet - was welcomed by nearly 2,000 of his people on his recent return to his headquarters in Hazarajat, a central district of the predominantly Hazara province of Bamyan.

He told local people not to expect too much of him, saying the rehabilitation of Afghanistan would be an uphill struggle as many regions of the country were as badly off as Bamyan.

“Before going to Kabul, I thought the Hazaras were the poorest and most unfortunate people of Afghanistan, yet after arriving in the capital I realised that problems exist in all corners of this country,” he said."

Document(s): Open document

17.06.2002 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Change in perception of minorities ("Minorities Make Themselves Heard") [#30493],  [ID 1176]

"A generation of war has changed the perception of some of Afghanistan's minorities. Uzbeks, found mainly in the north and Hazara, predominantly in the centre of the country, were traditionally considered minorities that needed central government protection.
But both groups are now politicised and armed as a result of the fighting. Uzbeks are active under General Abdel Rashid Dostum and his Junbesh-e-Islami party, while Hazaras have asserted themselves in the Hezb-e-Wahdat of Karim Khalili and the Haraket-e-Inqilabi of Ayatollah Asif Mohsini."

Document(s): Open document

06.04.2002 - Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR Sub-Office Northern Region District Profiles: District Kahmard (Baghlan) ("UNHCR Sub-Office Northern Region District Profiles: District Kahmard (Baghlan)") [#7336],  [ID 1178]

"Population Movement:
Most of IDPs and returnees have returned to their places of origin. Reportedly, the people still displaced have plannend to return in the next few months.

Minority Issue:
Families of Hazara ethnic group are minority in the area.

Land Ownership:
No problems reported. Shura is the main dispute-solving mechanism.

House Occupation:
Some houses of Hazaras living abroad have reportedly been occupied by Tajiks."

Document(s): Open document

04.2002 - Source: Solidarités

Solidarités: Analysis of situation of Hazara and other ethnic groups in Bamyan province : particular focus on food security ("Food Security Assessment in Afghan Rural Areas: District of Yakawlang - Bamyan Province") [#7989],  [ID 1573]

Document(s): Open document

01.2002 - Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RFE/RL: Hazara have traditionally been among poorest and powerless ethnic groups ("The Hazaras in Afghanistan: International aid agencies seek to avert famine among Hazaras; dream of Hazara university destroyed by war; Hazaras feel new strength with end of Taliban") [#7670],  [ID 1568]

"The Hazaras, who inhabit Afghanistan's central highlands, have traditionally been among the poorest and most powerless ethnic groups in the country. Today, their homeland is suffering severe food shortages as much of the population has been uprooted. But recent decades of war and particularly the fight against the Taliban have created a new sense of strength within the Hazara community that could change its prospects for the future. RFE/RL correspondent Charles Recknagel reports from the central highlands in a three-part series on the Hazara community of Afghanistan."

Document(s): Open document

03.2000 - Source: Johnson, Chris

Chris Johnson: Detailed report on political and social situation of Hazara ("Hazarajat Baseline Study — Interim Report") [#6501],  [ID 1569]

"Hazarajat is the most mono-ethnic area in Afghanistan. It is overwhelmingly Shia Imami Muslim, though there are some Ismaeli Shia and some Sunni Hazaras. Bamiyan is the most mixed area with 67% Hazara, 15% Tajik, 14% Sayyed, and just under 2% Pashtun and 2% Quizilabash. There are small numbers of other groups in some of the other districts, mostly traders. In general there seems to have been an increase in tensions between ethnic groups over last 20 years which cannot be separated from politics."

Document(s): Open document
afg-hazara-cjohn.pdf

02.1999 - Source:

Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker: The Hazara in Afghanistan ("Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker: Die Hazara in Afghanistan") [ID 1580]

Document(s): Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker: Die Hazara in Afghanistan

1997 - Source:

Library of Congress: Country Studies Afghanistan: Ethnic Groups: Hazara ("Library of Congress - Country Studies Afghanistan: Ethnic Groups: Hazara") [ID 1576]

Document(s): Library of Congress - Country Studies Afghanistan: Ethnic Groups: Hazara

Source: Emadi, Hafizullah

Hafizullah Emadi: Detailed background article on socio-political and societal developments within the Hazara ("Political Role") [#30687],  [ID 1574]

Document(s): Open document

Source: Berg Harpviken, Kristian

Kristian Berg Harpviken: Detailed background article on political history of Hazara since 1880 ("Background") [#30688],  [ID 1575]

Document(s): Open document