11.03.2008 - Source: US Department of State

Professionalisation of police and army forces continues; internal and external monitors helped to prevent abuses; human rights training as a regular element for police and army personnel ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007") [ID 23287]

"The government continued to develop and professionalize its army and police force. Increased oversight of police by internal and external monitors helped to prevent abuses, and human rights training became a regular element for police and army personnel. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued rank and pay reform efforts and removed officers involved in human rights violations and high-level corruption. International human rights groups stated that extensive reporting of human rights abuses led to increased arrests and prosecutions of abusers."

Document(s): Open document

11.2007 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

Facts and figures on the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) ("11th European Country of Origin Information Seminar; Vienna, 21 - 22 June 2007; Country Report; Afghanistan") [ID 21876]

"In terms of Security Sector Reform, the Afghan army (ANA) has been the biggest success. Its success is credited to its having been started from scratch - unlike the police that was largely composed of former militias.

ANA (Afghan National Army), 32,000, to reach 70,000 by 2010
ANP (Afghan National Police), about 50,000, to reached 82,000 by end-2010
ANAP (Afghan National Auxiliary Police), 3,212, to reach 9,063 by 1 May 2007. Focus in South and East – questions on fiscal sustainability and effects on DIAG"

Document(s): Open document

19.04.2007 - Source: BBC News

Afghan and Pakistani troops exchange fire over the latter's new anti-Taleban border fence, officials in Kabul say ("Afghanistan 'border fence' clash") [ID 19613]

Document(s): Open document

04.12.2006 - Source: UN Security Council

Afghan National Army remains poorly equipped and understaffed ("Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006 [S/2006/935]") [ID 18608]

"The mission saluted the performance of the Afghan National Army under exceptionally difficult circumstances and in the face of heavy losses. The Secretary of the Wolesi Jirga Defence Commission noted that despite commitments to develop an army of 70,000, the Afghan National Army remained poorly equipped and understaffed. President Karzai listed strengthening the Afghan National Army as his second highest national priority. ISAF Commander General Richards raised concerns about the pressure the war had placed on the development of the Afghan National Army and noted that only 14,143 combat troops were present and available for duty earlier this fall. At the same time, he praised the strong contributions of the Afghan National Army, especially to Operation Medusa."

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2004 - Source: UN General Assembly

Report focused on political developments, security situation (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, police and justice reform) human rights situation, health and nutrition, voluntary repatriation and reintegration ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security - Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan A/59/581 S/2004/925") [#27496],  [ID 827]

"20. The Afghan National Army, which is being formed under the lead of the United States of America, assisted by France, has grown to approximately 15,000 trained personnel, of which approximately 8,500 passed basic training during the review period. At full strength, it will consist of approximately 70,000 soldiers organized into five corps: the central corps in Kabul and four regional corps in Kandahar, Paktia, Herat and Balkh. The three brigades in the central corps are currently at full strength, with 15 battalions altogether. Plans are under way to develop the more technical elements of the corps, especially artillery, air defence and engineering. It is expected to take five to seven years to fully establish the regional corps. The process has begun, with four regional corps commanders and some of their key staff having been appointed on 1 September 2004. The Afghan National Army currently has 18 battalions deployed around the country on security and “show of force” tasks.
21. The main accomplishment of the Afghan National Army over the past year was the provision of security for the presidential election. It was an integral part of the nationwide security plan and played a major role in the search for improvised explosive devices before polling stations opened, in securing roads and as a visible quick-reaction force. In addition, it was primarily responsible for the security of the regional counting stations. Throughout the election the soldiers were highly visible and technically proficient and were able to secure the cooperation of Afghans in locating and neutralizing improvised explosive devices, rocket-launching areas and potential ambush sites.
22. The Afghan National Army also provided security, in isolated cases, for the mobile disarmament units conducting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. In addition, it was instrumental in separating the forces of Ismail Khan and his opponents, Amanullah Khan (Shindand) and Zahir Khan (Qalae- Naw), in western Afghanistan during the conflict in August 2004, when it deployed two battalions to the area at short notice, where they provided a buffer between the belligerent forces to allow negotiations to continue."

Document(s): Open document

11.2004 - Source: Danish Immigration Service

Establishment of ANA proceeds slowly - it has temporarily been able to suppress revolts, but is not permanently stationed outside Kabul. ("The political conditions, the security and human rights situation in Afghanistan; Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul, Afghanistan 20 March – 2 April 2004") [#27424],  [ID 828]

"4.3.2 Establishment of a national army
The EU Special Representative explained that the establishment of the ANA is proceeding very slowly. For the time being only 8,000 soldiers have been recruited. There is, however, some progress in the work of making a multi-ethnic army. For example, more and more Pashtuns are being accepted in the ANA. The source mentioned that it is a positive step that there has been a reshuffle in the Ministry of Defence and that the newly appointed Vice Minister for Defence is not a Mujaheddin.
The ICG explained that in Gardez in Paktia, the ANA was employed with the purpose of maintaining security in the city related to the appointment of government officers. The army was withdrawn later, but has returned. As a result the old power structure was challenged and the security situation in the town has improved.
Nevertheless, the source was of the opinion that the ANA was not a direct threat to the local warlords. Gardez is an example where the ANA was used to increase security, but at the same time the army is used against presumed Taliban supporters in southern Afghanistan. The ANA has not yet reached a size that seriously frightens the warlords. It is used against revolts, but is not permanently stationed anywhere outside Kabul. (p. 28)"

Document(s): Open document

30.03.2004 - Source: International Crisis Group

Compromise on 40 per cent reduction in size of AMF reached ("Elections and security in Afghanistan") [#20875],  [ID 829]

"[...] A compromise reached on 25 March 2004 by UNAMA, the ANBP, President Karzai, and Defence Minister Fahim, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, entailed only modest concessions by the minister. Under its terms, a 40 per cent reduction in the size of the AMF is to be achieved by decommissioning 20 per cent of the units and downsizing a further 20 percent by July 2004. The decommissioning is projected to include four Kabulbased units: Division 7, composed of Badakhshani and Panjshiri troops, linked respectively to former President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Fahim; Division 10, composed of troops from Paghman, linked to Ittihad i-Islami leader Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf; Division 31, composed of Hazara troops from the Harakat-i Islami faction led by Agriculture Minister Sayyid Hussain Anwari; and Regiment 42, a Pashtun unit. Of the units to be decommissioned, the most significant politically would be Division 10, based in West Kabul, near Sayyaf's stronghold of Paghman; neither Rabbani nor Anwari wield much authority in the capital.
Two of the three units in Kabul directly linked to Fahim, Divisions 1 and 8, composed largely of troops from Panjshir and Shamali, are slated only for downsizing. The failure to decommission these units ultimately reflects inadequate pressure on the defence minister from Coalition members, a result perhaps of the erroneous assumption that Fahim's present support for Karzai makes the disarmament of his forces less critical. Unless that pressure is brought to bear by July 2004, when the status of the three units will again be open to negotiation, however, Fahim will not only be able to project, but arguably even enhance his authority during the election campaign. Further progress on DR, as well as credible reforms in the defence ministry, would be compromised as a result. [...]"

Document(s): Open document

19.03.2004 - Source: UN General Assembly

Proceedings on recruitment and training of Afghan National Army: expected operational by summer of 2004 ("The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/58/742–S/2004/230") [#20724],  [ID 830]

"[...] 21. Under the lead of the United States of America, the Afghan National Army has trained a Central Corps of 5,271 troops, and 3,056 more recruits are in training at the Kabul Military Training Centre. The strengthening of the Army is being accelerated through the simultaneous training of three battalions of some 750 recruits each. The 14th Battalion, comprising 835 personnel, graduated on 15 February, and will be posted to the First Brigade of the Central Corps. The 15th Battalion is expected to complete its training on 21 March, adding a further 830 personnel to the First Brigade. The Central Corps should be completed by the end of March, at which time long-term development of the Regional Corps, which will eventually replace the current Afghan Militia Force structure, will start. It is expected that some 10,000 Afghan National Army troops — against the target strength of 70,000 to be achieved under a 10-year plan — will be operational by the summer of 2004. [...]
23. The officer corps of the Afghan National Army is being trained at the Command and General Staff College, which was formally inaugurated on 14 February. Currently, 60 officers are participating in a four-month course concentrating on personnel, logistics, education, policy-making and operational planning. [...]"

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Open document

08.03.2004 - Source: Human Rights Watch

Abuses by Afghan forces ("“Enduring Freedom:”Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan") [#20152],  [ID 831]

"[...] Afghan forces deployed alongside U.S. forces have been implicated in abuses during military operations. As noted elsewhere in this report, persons arrested by U.S. forces routinely complain about local Afghan forces looting their homes in the wake of U.S. military operations.
An Afghan journalist in Kandahar city told Human Rights Watch in November 2003 that he received several complaints in 2003 from residents in Zabul and Helmand about local forces operating with U.S. troops extorting money from villagers by threatening to tell U.S. forces that local residents are “with the Taliban,” claiming that the villagers will be targeted for arrest by the United States if they fail to pay certain sums of money - typically around 10,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately U.S.$175).
In October 2003, a reporter from the Los Angeles Times documented that local troops from Kandahar, working as guides for U.S. forces, looted homes and beat and tortured civilians during a week-long military operation in Zabul province, which lies directly to the east of Kandahar. Residents showed the journalist two young men who had been beaten by the troops; one described being severely beaten and blacking out, the other was still unconscious days after the attack. According to other residents, U.S. forces did not witness the abuses, but the Afghan troops allegedly stole “cash, jewelry, watches, radios, three motorcycles—even the mud-brick school’s windows and doors” before leaving when U.S. and Afghan troops moved on to other areas. Said one elder: “These people are robbing us, torturing us and beating us . . . . They are also taking innocent people to jail.”
In late October 2003, a spokesman for President Hamid Karzai said publicly that Karzai’s office had been receiving information about similar abuses by local troops for more than a year; that Karzai had told U.S. military commanders in Kabul that Afghan militias accompanying U.S. troops were committing abuses; that Karzai had suggested to U.S. commanders they not use Afghan militias in non-combat situations; and that the U.S. actions with local militias were undermining the overall effort to combat terrorism in Afghanistan. [...]"

Document(s): Open document

12.01.2004 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

More than a quarter of the newly-trained 10,000-strong Afghan National Army (ANA) have left the service due to tough training, low wages, factional links and forced recruitment ("Thousands of soldiers forsake new army") [#18659],  [ID 832]

Document(s): Open document

30.12.2003 - Source: UN Security Council

Report focused on security and human rights situation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants ("Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international S/2003/1212") [#18584],  [ID 843]

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Open document

03.12.2003 - Source: UN General Assembly

Afghan National Army established: 4 battalions will be ready to provide security during the Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003 ("Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (A/58/616)") [#18064],  [ID 833]

"24. Under the lead of the United States of America, 11 Afghan National Army battalions have been established, bringing the current force strength to about 6,500 soldiers out of an eventual 70,000. Four battalions will be ready to provide security during the Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003. In July 2003 two Afghan National Army battalions joined the United States-led coalition forces in Zurmat, Paktia province, to combat suspected Taliban and other insurgents. One battalion has also been deployed to Mazar-i-Sharif to help stabilize the area. Afghan National Army units temporarily deployed on training missions around the country, including in Gardez and Bamian, have been well received by Afghans, who have appreciated their discipline and professionalism."

Document(s): Open document

26.11.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Northern Afghanistan: the Junbesh-e-Milli-e-Islami movement and Jamiat-e-Islami faction handed over more than 30 armoured vehicles as the first step in a process of disarmament ("Northern Militias Hand Over Tanks") [#17871],  [ID 846]

Document(s): Open document

10.11.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Two militias commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad to be merged and incorporated into the Afghan National Army ("Warlords Told to Pack Up") [#17460],  [ID 834]

Document(s): Open document

20.10.2003 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

About 1,000 former officers of the Afghan army held a protest in Kabul against their dismissal ("Dismissed officers demonstrate in Kabul") [#16869],  [ID 835]

Document(s): Open document

23.07.2003 - Source: UN General Assembly

9 Afghan National Army battalions have been established ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/57/850–S/2003/754") [#14760],  [ID 836]

"29. Under the lead of the United States, nine Afghan National Army battalions have been established, totalling 6,500 personnel out of a projected strength of 70,000. The Central Corps has fielded six infantry battalions of the two infantry brigades and one infantry battalion of the Quick Reaction Brigade, which will later be air-mobile. The mechanized battalion of the Quick Reaction Brigade completed its basic training early in June 2003. Although the brigades are not operational yet, training is on track for the first infantry brigade to be ready by October 2003, in time to provide security during the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Initial deployments of units of the Afghan National Army have met with a positive response from Afghans who have observed the new soldiers’ disciplined and professional demeanour."

Document(s): Open document
Open document

06.2003 - Source: Giustozzi, Antonio

Background and composition of the Afghan Army - history, role of warlords, challenges for reconstruction ("Re-Building the Afghan Army") [#21426],  [ID 838]

Document(s): Open document

07.03.2003 - Source: Danish Immigration Service

DIS: Creation of the national army is progressing very slowly ("The Political, Security and Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan; 22 September - 5 October 2002") [#11326],  [ID 837]

"The Norwegian chargé d'affairs mentioned that the creation of the national army is progressing very slowly. There are currently discussions relating to the size of the army and its ethnic composition. A proposal has been made to include various ethnic groups in the army, but the size of the army causes many discussions. The Afghans have proposed a force of 140,000 men, which is the same percentage of the population in Afghanistan as the percentage of the American army in relation to the population of America. The question is, however, who should fund such a force in Afghanistan.
The international group of donors have suggested a force of about 80,000 men. The EU's special representative advised that less than 1,000 Afghans have had military training at present. There are currently no plans for the creation of a national army which have been approved by the government - the present plans were prepared by the donors. The EU's special representative mentioned two possible ways of building the army: either new volunteers could be trained or people could be picked from the existing militia. The source pointed out that the latter scenario would probably lead to the army being built up faster, but that in the end it would be a political choice. ICG said that there are attempts at recruiting members of local militia for the national army, but that this procedure is not supported by the USA. As long as there is no funding for the rebuilding, nothing will happen. Furthermore, it will take some time to build a national army. In this connection the source pointed out that the international security forces would not stay in Afghanistan for ever."

Document(s): Open document

07.03.2003 - Source: Danish Immigration Service

DIS: National Defence Council is intended to suggest plans for rebuilding of the defence force and the police force ("The Political, Security and Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: Report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan; 22 September - 5 October 2002") [#11326],  [ID 842]

"The Norwegian ambassador advised that a national defence council (National Defence Council) has been established, consisting of all the warlords. It is intended that this council suggest plans for rebuilding of the defence force and the police force as recommended by the donor countries. The council has started its work, but if an actual dialogue concerning the future national defence and police force does not get under way soon, the plan for the rebuilding will be lost. The council members - the warlords - are also the people who to a large extent control the income from the narcotics trade and the levy of customs duties."

Document(s): Open document

01.2003 - Source: CARE International

Slow progress in army development ("CARE International in Afghanistan Policy Brief: A New Year’s Resolution to Keep: Secure a Lasting Peace in Afghanistan") [#10422],  [ID 839]

"The international response to Afghanistan’s security gap has been consistent: Afghan security must be provided by Afghans. The preferred option, for both Afghans and the international community, has been to train an Afghan National Army (ANA) and police force.
Six months into this US-led effort, the signs are not good. Only 2-3,000 recruits have been trained to date in the ANA. About half of them have deserted, leaving behind 1,400 graduates as of November 24, 2002. On December 1, 2002, President Karzai issued a comprehensive decree urging greater national and international support for the ANA.
The reasons for slow progress are troubling: The persistence of post-conflict internecine tension has made it difficult to recruit an ethnically balanced army. Living conditions and low salaries for army graduates (at $50 per month) do not compare well to the lifestyle and income a young man can earn working for a regional militia or for Coalition-sponsored “anti-Al Qa’ida units” that operate outside the ANA structure. Militia commanders have been slow to release their best troops, instead volunteering their least motivated, worstequipped men, many of whom have already deserted.
The police training program, led by the Germans, is also in trouble. Average salaries at $24 per month create incentives for corruption and coercion of local populations. Like the national army, almost all trained police officers remain in Kabul.
The international commitment to Afghan security exists in principle, but has not been backed by the necessary financial support or adequate action. As a consequence, the security gap outside of Kabul has been filled by regional militias, who continue to act with virtual autonomy. Those regional militias will integrate into a national security structure only if the right incentives and guarantees are put in place. Until then, a truly representative Afghan national security force will remain a pipedream."

Document(s): Open document
care_afghanistan_policy_brief_jan_2003.pdf

30.08.2002 - Source:

NYT: Creation of the Afghan army is a distant prospect according to senior US official ("U.S. Backs Increase in Peacekeepers for Afghanistan") [ID 840]

US considers expansion of ISAF as establishment of Afghan army proves slower than expected

"Mr. Rumsfeld pushed for setting up an Afghan army as the solution to the country's security problems, saying that would enable the Afghans to become more self sufficient. American Special Forces in Afghanistan and United States Civil Affairs teams were also asked to use their influence with local warlords to bring calm in the country.
"The question is, Do you want to put your time and effort and money into the International Security Assistance Force — go take it from, say, 5,000 to 20,000 people?" Mr. Rumsfeld said in February. "Another school of thought, which is where my brain is, is that why put all the time and money and effort in that? Why not put it into helping them develop a national army so that they can look out for themselves over time?"
But the establishment of the Afghan army has gone slowly. The Pentagon says that army will number only 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers by the end of this year. Meanwhile, local warlords have continued to erode the authority of the central government in Kabul.
Problems in restoring order and delays in providing money from international donors have slowed efforts to rebuild the country, develop the economy and establish the rule of law. As a result, reconstruction has fallen well behind the pace in Kosovo after NATO's confrontation with Serbia.
"The creation of the Afghan army is a distant prospect," said James Dobbins, who served as the Bush administration envoy for Afghanistan and is now a senior official at the Rand Corporation, a government-financed research center. "There has not been a high enough level of security outside of Kabul to allow reconstruction outside the capital."
The slow pace has not been lost on the Pentagon, where officials are well aware that it will be harder for American forces to leave the country unless the economy develops, Mr. Karzai's authority is reinforced and warlords are reined in."

Document(s): U.S. Backs Increase in Peacekeepers for Afghanistan

30.07.2002 - Source: International Crisis Group

ICG: Defence Commission ("Afghanistan Briefing Paper: The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils") [#8257],  [ID 844]

"In early June 2002, under intense U.S. and UN pressure, Marshal Fahim agreed to a National Defence Commission to coordinate the national military command and deal with controversial issues such as disarmament and integration of militia forces into the new army. The Commission attempts to bring together all significant regional commanders – essentially forcing them into an ongoing dialogue. This Commission could be a crucial tool for checking the power of any individual commander and a standing forum in which to ease tensions between rival factions.
Failure to participate could lead to ostracisation of a recalcitrant commander.
Unlike the other commissions, which report to President Karzai, the Defence Commission is said to report directly to Fahim."

Document(s): Open document

11.07.2002 - Source: UN Security Council

UN Secretary-General: Armed forces ("The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security [A/56/1000–S/2002/737]") [#49253],  [ID 841]

"20. Absent truly national security forces and the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan remains hostage to this prevailing insecurity. Lack of tangible improvement in the security situation could seriously undermine the political and reconstruction efforts.
22. A concrete achievement in the security sector has been the creation of the first battalion of the National Guard, which was trained by ISAF. The battalion performed impeccably its assigned task of providing security for the Loya Jirga site. The United States of America has started an 18-month training programme that, it is hoped, will eventually provide 11,500 troops for the new Afghan army and border guard, and France is carrying out a parallel army training programme.
23. Serious problems, however, were encountered in assembling an ethnically and regionally balanced group of recruits for the first battalion of the National Guard. Similar difficulties are being experienced by the United States and French trainers. In addition, well over one third of the soldiers of the first battalion have, regrettably, left the unit since completing their training, due to a lack of support from the Ministry of Defence. This experience foreshadows the difficulty that will be faced during the creation and training of new armed forces in the absence of genuinely agreed national structures to form, house, equip and deploy these forces. The announcement of the establishment of a Commission for the specific purpose of creating the national army is a step in the right direction. This Commission must now begin to work earnestly and effectively.
24. It is important to realize that these new units will not be able to provide adequate security in Afghanistan for many months to come. In particular, they will not be available for most of the critical transitional period of the next 18 months. I therefore continue to believe that a limited expansion of ISAF to areas outside of Kabul would make a huge contribution to the consolidation of peace, and should be considered."

Document(s): Open document

17.04.2002 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Growing fears that the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance is aiming to monopolise country's fledgling national army ("Concern Over Tajik "Control" of New Army") [#29890],  [ID 845]

"The model for such a force is already in uniform in the shape of a battalion of 600 men, recently passed out from a western-run training camp. The plan is to take in 20 volunteers from each of the country's different provinces to guarantee an ethnic mix and only recruit them once they pass basic training satisfactorily.
All are expected to be fully literate, numerate. Trained by 160 foreign soldiers, some of the graduates can eventually expect further training in the US and Britain.
However, Captain Hashim said he was aware that this process might still be open to abuse by militia leaders in the provinces, who would simply push forward their favourites.
The first of the new battalions was turned out on January 14 under the inspecting eye of interim president Hamid Karzai. He also put great store by the independence and discipline of the new force. "I observe a new national army growing out of the destruction of the old one," he told the men. "I believe that you, young soldiers, will be devoted in rendering services to your country and people."
Much will depend on whether western military forces expand their present limited support for training and supplant the old amalgam of Turkish and Russian military systems that used to define the old Afghan national army.
A military delegation under British Major General Charles Campbell recently visited Kabul to assess how such a national army could be treated and how it might strengthen the interim government."

Document(s): Open document