Source:

Danger for reconstruction: USA and Worldbank warn of chaos; financial aid goes first off all to humanitarian help, not in new investment, Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [ID 215]

12.2007 - Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

The unemployment rate in Afghanistan is 32 percent; for marginalised groups, such as women and the disabled, the rate is much higher ("UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Afghan Asylum-Seekers") [ID 22752]

"It is estimated that the overall unemployment rate in Afghanistan is 32 percent, and for marginalized groups such as women and the disabled, the rate is much higher. Afghans have limited access to education and training, and labour rights hardly exist. By the end of 2010, the Afghanistan Government aims to train 150,000 Afghans in marketable skills – 40 percent of them will be women. Poverty in places affected by the conflict has an impact on insurgents’ recruitment as Afghans are driven by a lack of resources, poor education and general disenchantment."

Document(s): Open document

11.2007 - Source: Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

The Afghan government’s economic strategy ("11th European Country of Origin Information Seminar; Vienna, 21 - 22 June 2007; Country Report; Afghanistan") [ID 21875]

"The economic strategy, which has been developed by the government with the engagement and support of the International Community, particularly international finance institutions (IFI and World Bank), presented Afghanistan as a land bridge, that linked Central Asia to South Asia.The other key factor in the government’s strategy was that economic recovery would be led by the private sector. Factors militating against private sector led economic recovery included the lack of infrastructure (especially power), rising levels of corruption, a lack of enabling legislation, and above all else, deteriorating security."

Document(s): Open document

23.04.2007 - Source: UK Home Office

According to the World Bank's Economic Report is Afghanistan's economy devastated and distorted ("Country of Origin Information Report; Afghanistan") [ID 20263]

"On 9 September 2004, the World Bank published their first Economic Report on Afghanistan in a quarter of a century. The report noted that: “Afghanistan’s economy has been devastated and distorted by more than two decades of protracted conflict, capped by a severe nationwide drought in 1999-2001, but has bounced back in the last two years. The strong economic recovery is attributable to the end of drought and major conflict and initiation of reconstruction, and has been supported by sound, conservative Government macroeconomic policies, a highly successful currency reform, and structural reforms most notably in trade and the financial sector. Nevertheless Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and numerous people suffer from low food consumption, loss of assets, lack of social services, disabilities (e.g. from land-mine accidents), disempowerment, and insecurity. Moreover, daily life is still shaped by the consequences of almost a quarter century of conflict. One of these is ‘informality’ – most economic activities do not follow, and are not protected by, official and legal rules and some of them, such as cultivating opium poppy and the arms trade, are criminal. This has important implications for economic structure, policies, and reforms.”"

Document(s): Open document

15.03.2007 - Source: UN General Assembly

Report of the Secretary-General on security situation, security institutions, political developments, economic and social developments, human rights and rule of law ("Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security [A/61/799–S/2007/152]") [ID 19345]

Document(s): Open document

01.2007 - Source: Amnesty International

Economic and security situation still volatile; AI advocates not to return refugees to Afghanistan ("Ab in den Hindukusch") [ID 18790]

Document(s): Open document

30.01.2006 - Source: ReliefWeb

Report by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on an interim strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction ("Afghanistan National Development Strategy (UNAMA)") [#43080],  [ID 193]

Document(s): Open document

28.02.2005 - Source: US Department of State

Economic developments in 2004 ("Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004") [#29542],  [ID 194]

"The economy, based primarily on agriculture and animal husbandry, is market based. A July estimate found the population to be approximately 28.5 million, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the economic growth rate at 7.5 percent for the year. Wages kept pace with inflation. Persistent drought, low literacy, and slow recovery from over two decades of war were a strain on the economy. The country remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance, and approximately 50 percent of the Government's operating budget came from external donor support. According to the World Food Program (WFP), some 1.4 million citizens have been affected by continued drought and crop failures, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in November that opium cultivation increased by two-thirds and spread to all 32 provinces of the country. According to the UNODC report, narcotics became the main factor of economic growth, involving 10 percent of the population."

Document(s): Open document

27.01.2005 - Source:

CIA World Factbook 2004: Economy ("CIA World Factbook 2004 - Afghanistan"), Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [ID 196]

"Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Real GDP growth exceeded 8% in 2006. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, and the Afghan Government's inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. It will probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly raise Afghanistan's living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world. While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan's development, pledging over $24 billion at three donors' conferences since 2002, Kabul will need to overcome a number of challenges. Expanding poppy cultivation and a growing opium trade generate roughly $3 billion in illicit economic activity and looms as one of Kabul's most serious policy concerns. Other long-term challenges include: budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, government capacity, and rebuilding war torn infrastructure."

Document(s): CIA World Factbook 2004 - Afghanistan

05.2004 - Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan - three Case Studies ("Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities (Author: Stefan Schütte)") [#25391],  [ID 197]

Document(s): Open document

19.03.2004 - Source: UN General Assembly

Efforts to combat illegal drugs continue against background of expanding opium production ("The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/58/742–S/2004/230") [#20724],  [ID 198]

"[...]
30. A continuing and expanding threat to the success of State-building in Afghanistan is the growth in the production, trafficking and trade in illegal narcotics. Its negative effects are widespread: it distorts the wage structure, generates corruption within the civilian and military establishment at all levels, and distorts the finances of the agricultural economy. The annual farmer’s intention survey for Afghanistan, conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and released on 18 February 2004, brings further bad news, indicating that opium production may further expand in the coming year. Two producers out of three interviewed stated that they intended to increase significantly their opium production in 2004. The rapid assessment survey subsequently conducted in February gave additional confirmation of that likely trend.
31. Against this deteriorating background, efforts to combat illegal drugs continue. The ban on drug production, trafficking and consumption has been codified in the new Afghan constitution. The narcotic drugs law, drafted by the Ministry of Justice and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime last year, came into force on 25 January, providing a robust legal framework for prosecuting drug-related offences. The Government, with support from the coalition forces, has initiated a strategy to combat narcotics more robustly and recently conducted successful interdiction operations in Badakhshan and Laghman Provinces. In addition, a central eradication planning cell, led by the Ministry of the Interior, with support from the United Kingdom — the lead nation for international assistance in Afghan drug control — the United States and the Counter-Narcotics Directorate is being established to identify target districts for poppy eradication and to assess the effectiveness of the eradication campaign. [...]"

Document(s): Open document
Open document

19.03.2004 - Source: UN General Assembly

UN Secretary-General: Economic dividends felt mainly in urban areas and some provincial centres ("The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/58/742–S/2004/230") [#20724],  [ID 199]

"[...]
47. As the second year of Afghanistan's transition comes to a close, gains have been secured in the social and economic fields. [...]
48. The economic dividends have been felt mainly in urban areas and some provincial centres. Provincial and district administrations, which are critical to longterm national stability, continue to receive inadequate support relative to central institutions. This situation must be redressed through concerted training initiatives and the strengthening of systems to ensure timely salary and non-salary transfers from the capital. Large national programmes, such as the National Area-based Development Programme, the National Solidarity Programme and the National Emergency Employment Programme are being implemented as means of ensuring a more equitable spread of assistance benefits to local communities, as well as to facilitate capacity-building and organizational reform in ministries such as the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission is being assisted by UNDP with regard to merit-based recruitment, as well as training and capacity-building for civil servants. Afghanistan's emerging private sector, a potential engine of recovery and growth, remains underutilized. Multi-sector efforts to reintegrate 2.3 million former refugees must be accelerated in view of the large number of new returns that are expected in 2004. In the coming year, more creative mixtures of public and private investment will be needed to generate opportunities for demobilized combatants to rejoin the civilian economy, and to assist farmers to stop participating in opium cultivation.
49. Importantly, 2004 marks the first time in 13 years that the United Nations has not prepared an annual consolidated appeal for Afghanistan. This shift in longstanding practice reflects an increasing recognition of the leadership, sophistication and capacity of the Transitional Authority with regard to raising and directing international funds towards identified national priorities, and the effectiveness of the national budget as a strategic coordination instrument. [...]
50. Since late 2003, several United Nations agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions have supported the Transitional Administration in preparing a long-term costing exercise entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s future”. The study seeks to provide a conclusive and comprehensive calculation of the cost of meeting defined recovery and reconstruction targets across a wide range of sectors. A global investment figure of $28.5 billion over seven years was reached on the basis of indepth sectoral assessments and economic growth projections. Of that amount, an investment requirement of $7 billion was identified for the social sectors, including health, education, refugees and internally displaced persons, and social protection. It is hoped that the document, to be presented to the international community on 31 March 2004 in Berlin, will guide and encourage donors to solidify their multi-year commitments to Afghanistan. [...]"

Document(s): Open document
Open document

02.2004 - Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Livelihoods of the Poor in Kabul ("Some Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan (Author: Pamela Hunte)") [#25440],  [ID 200]

Document(s): Open document

2004 - Source: UN Development Programme

1st report on human development in Afghanistan notes many gains; however, lack of jobs, health, education, income, dignity and opportunities for participation could be new sources of conflict and instability ("Human Development Report 2004 - Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities") [#29245],  [ID 195]

Document(s): Open document

03.12.2003 - Source: UN General Assembly

Afghanistan makes progress towards post-war recovery ("Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (A/58/616)") [#18064],  [ID 201]

"[...]
46. During the review period, Afghanistan has made definite progress towards post-war recovery. Gross domestic product grew by 30 per cent in 2002-2003, and is expected to grow by a further 20 per cent in 2004. Other achievements include the rehabilitation of the national primary education system and the successful management of one of the largest United Nations-assisted refugee repatriation efforts in history (see paras. 64-67 below). Serious challenges remain, however. The most important of these is to create a secure environment in the south of Afghanistan so that reconstruction activities can take place. Equally crucial are the central Government’s efforts to extend its authority, enhance its administrative capacity and deliver socio-economic benefits on a nationwide scale.
47. The blueprint for post-war recovery is contained in Afghanistan’s national development budget. The budget for the current year is $1.8 billion. As of mid-September, total donor commitments to the development budget are $1.2 billion. Of this, $529 million has been disbursed, representing 29 per cent of budget requirements and 40 per cent of funds committed by donors. The funding shortfall means that many programmes remain under-delivered. The potential for donor fatigue is particularly worrying given that next year’s development budget will increase to $2.5 billion as the implementation of larger projects accelerates.
48. United Nations assistance to Afghanistan is channelled through the Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan. Launched in December 2002, it established priorities and strategies for coordinated international assistance in support of relief, recovery and reconstruction. The Programme reflects an agreement between the Transitional Administration and the United Nations to ensure that United Nations humanitarian programming supports the national priorities identified by the Government in the national development budget and strengthens the Government’s implementation capacity. For the period covering January 2003 to March 2004, the Programme originally sought $815 million. This was subsequently reduced to $715 million, as the Programme was consolidated with the national development budget. As of October 2003, some $360 million in contributions had been received, meaning that just over 50 per cent of the revised requirements for the Programme have been met. An additional $354 million is still needed.
49. In order to strengthen programme collaboration between the United Nations and Government partners, it was jointly agreed to conduct periodic joint programme reviews. At the first such review, held in late September 2002, agencies were requested to submit their individual agency plans for 2003 to an inter-ministerial committee. The objective of this midterm review was to assess the implementation of the 1382 (March 2002-March 2003) development budget identify critical funding gaps and evaluate lessons learned. The review demonstrated that the national development budget is becoming the primary instrument of government policymaking and that the consultative group process is becoming the main mechanism for coordinating government, donors and United Nations agencies.
50. In June 2003 the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development launched the National Area-Based Development Programme (see A/57/850-S/2003/333, para. 8). Under the leadership of provincial governors, four-day local planning workshops identified district-level development priorities in 21 provinces, where at least one priority project will be funded during 2003. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, also initiated the National Solidarity Programme, which aims to develop community level development capacities. Nineteen national and international non-governmental organizations have been granted one-year contracts as facilitating partners in 29 provinces, with further contracts covering the remaining three provinces expected shortly. Over the next year, some 6,900 villages in 96 districts will participate in the Programme (see A/57/850-S/2003/333, para. 9). [...]"

Document(s): Open document

03.12.2003 - Source: UN General Assembly

Road reconstruction programs ("Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (A/58/616)") [#18064],  [ID 202]

"70. In July 2003 the United States of America and Japan began repairing six sectors of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, totalling 439 kilometres in length. Elsewhere, Pakistan and the European Union are undertaking reconstruction of the Torkham-Kabul road; the Asian Development Bank is proceeding on the Spin Boldak-Kandahar sector; the Islamic Republic of Iran should complete work on the Islam Qala-Herat road early next year; and Saudi Arabia is repairing a portion of the Kandahar-Herat road. As part of a $108 million World Bank emergency transport rehabilitation programme, reconstruction of the Salang Tunnel, the main road link between the north and the south of the country, began in July 2003 under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works."

Document(s): Open document

03.12.2003 - Source: UN General Assembly

Series of government reforms includes appointment of new provincial customs supervisors ("Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (A/58/616)") [#18064],  [ID 212]

"[...] 3. The central Government has promulgated a series of reforms, including the appointment of new provincial customs supervisors, to improve revenue collection from the provinces. In the first quarter of the current fiscal year, which began on 21 March 2003, Government revenue collection surpassed that of the entire previous fiscal year. The Government anticipates raising at least $200 million this fiscal year. The introduction of the new Afghan currency, completed in January 2003, was another crucial reform. The general stability of the currency following its introduction underlines the effectiveness of this reform. [...]"

Document(s): Open document

11.2003 - Source: ReliefWeb

1.2 billion Dollar package for Afghanistan approved by Congress and signed by US President ("BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review; November 2003"), Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [#18299],  [ID 203]

"[...] Economic developments
On 6th November, the US President signed an $87.5 billion package approved by Congress for Iraq and Afghanistan. Of this, $1.2 billion is for Afghanistan. Part of this will be allocated to the electoral process geared to the holding of elections in June. Other priorities will be security sector reform, reconstruction of the Kabul to Herat section of the national highway, and education.
The US embassy in Dushanbe has announced that US military engineers have begun preliminary work on building a road bridge over the Amu Darya river that separates Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
The Asian Development Bank has agreed to fund a preparatory study of the road linking Herat to Andkhoy, in Faryab province. This part of the circular ring road that connects Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif covers relatively difficult terrain and has, historically, suffered from under-investment. Improvement of this road could significantly increase trade with the Central Asian Republics as well as facilitate internal communications. [...]"

Document(s): Open document

11.2003 - Source: ReliefWeb

Government agrees to increase salaries of government staff ("BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review; November 2003"), Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [#18299],  [ID 204]

"[...] The Afghan government has agreed to increase the salaries of government staff by up to seven times. About 40% of the 450,000 employees are said to benefit. However, the government has laid off many staff in an effort to rationalise both the civil service and the army payrolls. One man was killed on 23rd November when soldiers opened fire on a demonstration by former army officers and other Defence Ministry personnel seeking reinstatement and payment of wage arrears. [...]"

Document(s): Open document

30.10.2003 - Source: Integrated Regional Information Network

Poppy cultivation continues to grow; opium poppy now planted in 28 of the country's 32 provinces; total income from opium-related activities - farming plus trafficking - in 2003 might have amounted to about half of the country’s GDP ("Poppy cultivation continues unabated") [#17424],  [ID 205]

"Poppy cultivation in beleaguered Afghanistan continues to grow, despite efforts to curb its spread, a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has revealed. In its annual survey, the Vienna-based agency found that opium poppy was now being planted in 28 of the country's 32 provinces."

Document(s): Open document

08.2003 - Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Study of winter vulnerability and coping strategies of families participating in a cash-for-work programme: income generating strategies, shelter, and social networks ("One Hundred Households in Kabul. A study of winter vulnerability, coping strategies, and the impact of cash-for-work programmes on the lives of the “vulnerable”") [#18868],  [ID 206]

Document(s): Open document

08.07.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Kandahar: Pakistani workers are illegally crossing the Afghan border to take jobs, while unskilled Afghan workers remain unemployed ("Kandahar's Employment Crisis") [#14211],  [ID 207]

Document(s): Open document

16.06.2003 - Source: BBC News

3,000 domestic and international firms registered to invest in Afghanistan but have been put off by corruption ("Afghan leader attacks corruption") [#13563],  [ID 208]

Document(s): Open document

09.06.2003 - Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Provincial authorities gave government officials access to their records and pledged to hand over much of their customs earnings ("Karzai's Taxmen Net Millions") [#13912],  [ID 209]

Document(s): Open document

23.05.2003 - Source: Refugees International

Report focused on political and economic environment, humanitarian situation and future outlook ("Afghanistan bulletin") [#13806],  [ID 210]

Document(s): Open document

01.2003 - Source: Overseas Development Institute

Warlords and the economy of war ("Afghanistan’s political and constitutional development (Authors: Chris Johnson, William Maley, Alexander Thier and Ali Wardak)") [#11961],  [ID 211]

"Warlord power is inextricably tied to the economy of war that has developed over the last two decades. This war economy relies heavily on poppy cultivation and opium production (until the Taliban's ban on poppy cultivation in 2000, Afghanistan was the world's single largest source of opium); gems (mainly emeralds from the Panjshir Valley and lapis lazuli from Badakhshan); arms smuggling; and the unregulated trade in legitimate goods.
This trade would normally be a source of revenue for the central exchequer, but customs dues largely remain with local power-holders. The trade includes goods to be smuggled into Pakistan, thus evading that country's high tariffs. Some of these goods are duty-free items from Dubai, which are transported through Afghanistan into Pakistan. Others enter Afghanistan under Pakistan's Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) of 1950, which allows sealed trucks carrying goods for Afghanistan to transit Pakistan duty-free. Many of these goods are immediately smuggled back into Pakistan. The smuggling trade increased enormously after 1992, with the loss in customs revenues to Pakistan climbing from $87.5m in 1992 to $500m in 1995. Today's clashes between commanders from different groups are essentially a fight for control of the trade routes running through their territory, and the lucrative taxation of goods passing along them. In the west of the country, the fighting between Ismael Khan and Gul Agha is a battle over transport routes to Iran and Central Asia. In Nangarhar, clashes in the wake of the assassination of Haji Qadir have been linked to control of trade routes for smuggling heroin and other goods into Pakistan.
[...] To even begin to establish some control over warlord power and the war economy will require action on many levels. The stricter control over money which the new currency will allow should help, but financial flows will also need to be tracked in order to stem illegal activity; international support is needed for this. Control of borders will be both important and difficult, and will require a regional approach. A legal framework will need to be stablished, along with the law-enforcement capacity to make it a reality. One of the complications, however, is that many of the structures used in the war economy are also part of legitimate trade. The hawala money transfer system, for example, can certainly be used for illegal trade, but it is also the key way that remittances are transferred back to the country. Clamping down on it could thus further impoverish some of the country's poorest communities."

Document(s): Open document

06.12.2002 - Source: Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe

Economy of Afghanistan ("Lageanalyse Herbst 2002 (German)") [#10325],  [ID 214]

"Im Verlauf von mehr als zwanzig Jahren Krieg kam die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zum Stillstand und der grösste Teil der Infrastrukturen des Landes wurde zerstört. Afghanistan gehört zu den ärmsten Ländern der Welt. Seit 1979 hat der Krieg die physischen und menschlichen Ressourcen, die sich während der vorangegangenen Periode einer zaghaften Entwicklung gebildet hatten, ruiniert und zerstreut.
Der Landwirtschaftssektor bildet die hauptsächliche Ressource von Afghanistan. Es handelt sich vor allem um eine Landwirtschaft für den eigenen Bedarf, dominiert durch den Anbau von Weizen, dem wichtigsten Getreide. Vor dem Krieg war Baumwolle eines der hauptsäch-lichsten Exportprodukte. Die Fruchtkulturen (insbesondere Trauben und Melonen) bilden einen nicht zu vernachlässigenden Bestandteil der afghanischen Wirtschaft. Die Viehzucht (vor allem von Schafen und Ziegen) stellt ebenfalls eine wichtige Einnahmequelle dar. Af-ghanistan ist ein bedeutender Produzent von Karakulschaf-Fellen und von Leder. Mit dem Krieg sind jedoch die Landwirtschaft und die Schafzucht zusammengebrochen und ihre Er-neuerung wird durch die Zerstörung und die Verwahrlosung zahlreicher Bewässerungskanä-le behindert. Gemäss UNO hat sich um die Jahre 1991 und 1992 die Anbaufläche im Ver-gleich zur Zeit vor dem Krieg auf die Hälfte reduziert, und die Produktivität gewisser Kultu-ren hat um 70 Prozent abgenommen. Die Ernten wurden oft durch die Kämpfe und die Bom-bardierungen behindert.
Der industrielle Sektor beschränkt sich auf kleine Unternehmen, die hauptsächlich die Ver-arbeitung der lokalen Landwirtschaftsprodukte vornehmen. Ein paar handwerkliche Produk-te werden immer noch vor Ort hergestellt: Teppiche (gewoben und geknüpft), Stoffe, Seide, Leder, Zucker, Fruchtkonserven, Kohle und Zement. Aber gesamthaft betrachtet hat der Industriesektor schwer unter dem Rückschlag durch den Krieg gelitten und ist praktisch ver-schwunden. Das Wasserkraftpotenzial ist nicht unbeträchtlich, aber bis jetzt wird es noch nicht genutzt. Vor dem Krieg lag die Elektrizitätsproduktion in der Umgebung von Kabul über dem Energiebedarf dieses Sektors. Heute verfügen nur gewisse Regionen im Norden Afghanistans und einige städtische Zentren über eine Stromversorgung. Erdgas wird in die Länder der ehemaligen Sowjetunion exportiert.[...]"

Document(s): Open document

30.09.2002 - Source: ReliefWeb

Budget ("BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review; Sept 2002"), Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [#12269],  [ID 216]

"Much of the confusion has related to different budgetary and payment cycles, uncertainty over whether pledges related to grants or loans and whether they included humanitarian as well as reconstruction funding. Varying degrees of transparency have clouded the picture.
Based on an analysis undertaken by the AACA, the indications, to date, are that, overall, the international community has delivered 51.6% of the amount pledged at Tokyo. Within this there are significant differences. The USA has thus disbursed $350 million, which represents 117.8% of the amount pledged for 2002 while Europe, including both member state contributions and the European Commission, has disbursed a total of $432 million, which represents 62% of the amount pledged.
The AACA analysis also indicates that, as at 25th September 2002, the transitional government faced a shortfall of between $100 and $150 million on its budget of $460 for the Afghan financial year (21 March 2002 - 20 March 2003). Of the $960 million disbursed since Tokyo, only $90 million, or 9% of the total, has been provided directly to the transitional government, although a total of approximately $210 million is expected to be transferred to the government during the financial year.
The AACA analysis shows that $4.3 billion of the $5.2 billion pledged at Tokyo is in grant form.
In addition to the funds actually disbursed i.e. paid into the bank accounts of implementers or into a Trust Fund, $1.3 billion of the $1.87 billion has been committed to specific projects.
About 60% of the funds disbursed have been allocated to humanitarian relief activities and 40% to reconstruction activities. However, much of this reconstruction assistance is to support programmes such as education, basic sanitation to IDPs/returnees and de-mining. Very little indeed has gone on the conventional reconstruction sector such as transport, power, telecommunications or other infrastructure. This, of course, reflects the fact that one of the largest repatriation programmes ever has needed to be supported and that the impact of the drought continues to be felt in many areas, creating a very large IDP population. AACA is preparing information at the project level and this will provide useful insights (web site: http://aacadad.undp.org)."

Document(s): Open document

30.09.2002 - Source: ReliefWeb

Economy is only picking up very slowly ("BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review; Sept 2002"), Autor: British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) [#12269],  [ID 217]

"He is therefore mindful of the fact that the Afghan economy is only picking up very slowly. Although Kabul is, in many ways, quite buoyant, it is difficult to be clear to what extent this is contingent on the economic bubble created by the presence of so many international personnel working for the aid system, international financial institutions and embassies. Elsewhere in the country, the urban areas of Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad are seeing, at best, only very gradual growth. There are no signs of significant inward investment and the economy is largely reliant on increased entrepreneurial activity by Afghan traders, together with the customs revenue generated by trade links with Iran and Central Asia."

Document(s): Open document